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Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an
Alternative Model of "Authorship"
Alan L. Durham*
Information theory, born shortly after World War II, has long
been a fruitful source of interdisciplinary study, producing insights
into communication so apparently universal and so intriguingly
counterintuitive that fields as diverse as experimental psychology,
particle physics, philosophy, biology, economics, and aesthetics have
felt its influence.' Among recent advances in mathematics, perhaps
only game theory has inspired theoreticians in so many diverse
subjects. 2 One field that so far has not been subjected to information
theory analysis is copyright law. Perhaps this demonstrates the
pragmatic good sense of copyright scholars-aw is not, after all,
subject to mathematical proofs. Nevertheless, this Article argues that
information theory can contribute useful insights into copyright
doctrine, in part by suggesting a more objective and more inclusive
alternative to the traditional model of "authorship."

* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; J.D. University of
California, Berkeley, 1988. I would like to thank the University of Alabama Law School
Foundation, the Edward Brett Randolph Fund, and Dean Kenneth Randall for their support of
this research. I would also like to thank Professors Mark Lemley and Pamela Samuelson, and
the students participating in Professor Lemley's intellectual property colloquium at U.C.
Berkeley who listened to and critiqued some of my early thoughts on this subject. Thanks also
to Creighton Miller of the University of Alabama Law School Library for his assistance in
locating sources.
1. See Joel E. Cohen, Translator's Preface to ABRAHAM MOLES, INFORMATION
THEORY AND ESTHETIC PERCEPTION (Joel E. Cohen trans., Univ. of Ill. Press 1966) (1958)
("Standard-bearers of information theory [in the 1950s] were plunging into genetics,
neurophysiology, sociology, experimental psychology, linguistics, and philosophy with great
enthusiasm and greater hopes."); L. DAVID RITCHIE, INFORMATION 7 (Steven H. Chaffer ed.,
1991) ("[Information theorist Claude] Shannon's second essay was widely read by
mathematicians, philosophers, psychologists, and others who incorporated its key ideas into
disciplines as diverse as electronic engineering, economics, biology, psychology, and the new
discipline of cognitive science.").
2. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); ROBERT
GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992); JAMES D. MoRRow, GAME
THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS

OF CONFLICT (1991).
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The central character in the copyright drama is the "author,"
whose distinguishing characteristic is "originality." Rights to
copyrightable works belong, at least initially, to the author3 and
extend only as far as the author's original expression. 4 In order to be
copyrighted, a work must exhibit at least a small measure of
originality.' Most works surpass this threshold so easily that little
inquiry into what we mean by "author" or "originality" is required.
Generally, even the poorest sketch and the most hackneyed novel are
unmistakably the products of the mind and abilities of a particular
individual. Some works, however, do not so clearly exhibit an
"author's" influence-highly factual works, such as telephone
directories, with unremarkable characteristics of selection and
organization; works that nearly reproduce existing works by other
authors; or works created by mechanical processes with little human
intervention. In such cases, the concept of authorship demands
closer scrutiny.
The traditional model of authorship is frequently described as the
"romantic" model.6 The paragon of romantic authorship is an
individual who possesses "privileged access to the numinous." 7 The
romantic author employs his or her gifts in the service of mankind,
creating works to entertain and enlighten-works that are
unmistakably and uniquely the product of the author's singular
vision. This conception of authorship has by no means disappeared;
many authors and artists are still revered for their genius, and new
provisions of the Copyright Act protecting artists' "moral rights,"'
particularly in certain works of "recognized stature," 9 suggest the
continuing vitality of the romantic model.
Recently, however, both literary critics and legal scholars have
questioned the romantic notion of authorship as an expression of

3. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) ("Copyright in a work protected under this title vests
initially in the author or authors of the work.").
4. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) ("[Clopyright
protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.").
5. See id. at 345-46.
6. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1008 (1990).
7. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 'Authorship,"
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 459.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (governing the "moral rights" of attribution and
integrity).
9. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
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individual will. Critics focus on the work, or "text," at the expense of
the author. The "text" is a product of the author's cultural
influences as much as his or her unique persona.' ° In the
collaborative endeavor of text consumption, the audience is at least
as important as the author;" consequently, all readings of a text are
valid, even if they are not what the author intended. 2 Perhaps
Roland Barthes exaggerated when he announced "The Death of the
Author,"' 3 but certainly the prevailing analytical perspective leaves
the author greatly diminished.
On the copyright front, scholars have similarly questioned
whether authorship is correctly envisioned as creation ex nihilo. It is
often more accurate, they point out, to imagine authors assembling
their works from the scraps of their cultural environment,
transforming and adapting rather than making anew. 4 Naive
acceptance of authorship as a predominantly individual and creative
act may foster authorial rights that are too broad or too powerful for
the good of society.
Perhaps literary theorists can choose to ignore the author, but
copyright law cannot. The principal object of copyright is to
encourage authors, by the grant of exclusive economic rights, to
create writings for the ultimate benefit of the public." Authors own
those rights, until they are otherwise assigned, and the principle of
authorship determines, in significant measure, the dividing line
between private ownership and the public domain.' 6 Attacks on the

10. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MusIC-TEXT 142,

146 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) ("The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the
innumerable centres of culture.").
11. See Jaszi, supra note 7, at 458 n.9 ("[W]hatever form [the text] takes, it is created
not in the act of writing but in the act of reading. It 'asks of the reader a practical
collaboration."' (quoting ROLAND BARTHES, From Work to Text, in IMAGE-Music-TEXT 155,

163 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977)); David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls:
Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REv. 1, 167 (2001) ("Literary theory has moved
beyond the revelation from on-high of 'authority (the auctoritasof authorship)' to a realm in
which it is the interpretive community that constitutes the text, and the reader reigns
supreme.") (footnotes omitted).
12.

See BARTHES, supra note 10, at 146.

13.

BARTHES, supra note 10, at 142.

14. See Litman, supra note 6, at 966-67.
15. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
16. See Litman, supra note 6, at 1000 ("What we rely on in place of physical borders, to
divide the privately-owned from the commons and to draw lines among the various parcels in
private ownership, is copyright law's concept of originality.").
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romantic model of authorship lead us to wonder what "unromantic"
model could take its place for purposes of copyright. In other words,
how can we conceptualize authorship as a largely transformative
act-an elaboration and juxtaposition of existing materials-without
losing our sense of what authorship is or how to distinguish between
the original and unoriginal, or "authored" and "un-authored,"
aspects of a copyrighted work?
It is here that information theory may be useful. As the translator
of a work exploring links between information theory and aesthetics
warns, in this context "[t]he role of information theory. . . is mainly
heuristic: suggestive and exploratory."' 7 Information theory can
prove, to the satisfaction of an engineer, the capabilities and
limitations of a telemetry system; it cannot prove what Congress
intended in the copyright statutes or demonstrate what judicial
ruling best promotes creativity. On the other hand, the principles of
information theory embrace, at a very fundamental level, all forms of
communication. Since works of authorship are, by and large,
communicative," it is at least a tantalizing notion that a legal
conception of authorship could be constructed upon theoretical
foundations laid by information theory.' 9
I conclude that such an approach is feasible if authorship is
conceived as the unconstrained selection of one means of expression
from an array of alternative means--a definition that mirrors
information theorists' approach to quantifying the information
encoded in a message. That conception of authorship, already
suggested by existing parallels between information theory and
copyright's doctrine of "merger," answers some of the criticism
directed at the traditional "romantic" model--namely, that it

17. Cohen, supranote 1.
18. Computer software might be considered an exception, but even a program's source
code is capable of communicating information to another programmer.
19. Caution, though, is certainly in order, given the temptation to draw firm
conclusions from loose language. As John R. Pierce said in his valuable survey of the field,
[C]ommunication theory... deals in a very broad and abstract way with certain
important problems of communication and information, but it cannot be applied to
all problems which we can phrase using the words communication and information
in their many popular senses .... We have no reason to believe that we can unify all
the things and concepts for which we use a common word.
JOHN R. PIERCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION THEORY: SYMBOLS, SIGNALS AND

NOISE 18 (2d rev. ed., Dover Publ'ns 1980) (1961).
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overemphasizes the role of the truth-inspired, meaning-conveying,
solitary author/genius.
Part I of this Article explains some of the most basic principles of
information theory, including the paradoxical relationship between
information and "entropy." It also discusses differing interpretations
of those basic principles and attempts to incorporate meaning into
the discussion of information. Part II examines, briefly, the legal
concepts of authorship and originality, which have been aptly
described as "the very 'premise of copyright law."' 2 Finally, Part III
considers how a more inclusive, "unromantic" model of authorship,
in which authorship is primarily an act of selection from an array of
alternatives, might be fashioned along lines suggested by information
theory.
I. SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION THEORY

A. Shannon's Paradox
The founders of information theory include such luminaries as
Norbert Wiener, Harry Nyquist, and R.V.L. Hartley, 2 but the
cornerstone of subsequent research is the work of mathematician
Claude Shannon. Shannon worked for Bell Laboratories, the
research division of AT&T, which perhaps explains his interest in the
subject of communication, as well as his interpretation of what he
discovered. Shannon's insights were first published in the July and
October 1948 issues of the Bell System Technical Journaland were
eventually republished
as
The Mathematical Theory of
Communication, with an explanatory, comparatively speculative essay
by Warren Weaver.2 2 Today, Bell Labs celebrates Shannon's research
as one of its greatest achievements, comparable to the invention of
the transistor and the laser.2"
20. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (quoting
Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981)).
21. See YEHOSHUA BAR-HILLEL, An Examination of Information Theory, in LANGUAGE
AND INFORMATION 275, 283-85 (Hartley Rogers, Jr. ed., Addison-Wesley Publ'g Co. 1964)
(1955) (discussing an early work by Hartley); GUY JUMARIE, RELATIVE INFORMATION:
THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 1 (Hermann Haken ed., 1990).
22. CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF
COMMUNICATION (Univ. Ill. Press 1964).
23. See Lucent Techs., The Exciting World of Bell Labs, at http://www.belllabs.com/history (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
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Shannon's ultimate concern was the accurate and efficient
the essential
communication of messages. Shannon diagrammed
24
elements of a communication system as follows:
Figure 1
INFORMATION
SOURCE

RECEIVER

TRANSMITTER

SIGNAL
MESSAGE

DESTINATION

RECEIVED
SIGNAL

MESSAGE

D
NOISE
SOURCE

Although the arrows (representing the communication
"channel") connecting the transmitter and receiver are reminiscent
of a telephone wire, the diagram applies to any means of
communication," including speech, 6 text, television broadcast, or

24. This diagram is adapted from Shannon's schematic, SHANNON & WEAVER, supra
note 22, at 34 fig. 1. See also id. at 33-35. Some subsequent versions of this diagram substitute
the terms "encoder" and "decoder" for "transmitter" and "receiver." See, e.g., RTCHIE, supra
note 1, at 12; see also SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 17 ("[O]ne says, in general,
that the function of the transmitter is to encode, and that of the receiver to decode, the
message.").
25. "Communication" can be defined in various ways. Weaver suggested the "very
broad sense" that includes "all of the procedures by which one mind may affect another," but
then observed that even broader definitions are possible, such as "one which would include the
procedures by means of which one mechanism (say automatic equipment to track an airplane
and to compute its probable future positions) affects another mechanism (say a guided missile
chasing this airplane)." SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 3. While copyright generally
presumes a human audience, it is less clear that the "writing" of an "author" must originate in
that author's mind as opposed, for example, to some mechanism under the author's control.
See infra note 246.
26. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 7 ("When I talk to you, my brain is the
information source, yours the destination; my vocal system is the transmitter, and your ear and
the associated eighth nerve is the receiver.").
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semaphore. There is always a sender, a recipient, and a channel of
communication, which can be anything from acoustic vibrations in
the air, to electrical impulses, to symbols recorded on paper.27 In
some fashion, the information to be transmitted must be reduced to
the form suitable for the channel and reconstructed on the receiving
end. In the case of a written communication, the message must be
encoded by the sender into alphabetical symbols that can be decoded
and understood by the reader for whom they are intended.
Multiple layers of encoding may be encountered. A thought
might be encoded, in a sense, into language,28 encoded again into
written symbols representing that language, and further transformed
to match intervening modes of transmission (e.g., binary code
representation to electrical impulses or electromagnetic waves), all of
which must be reversed for the original thought to be reconstructed.
Most, if not all, channels of communication are subject to
noise---spurious data that threatens to corrupt the intended
message. 29 Depending on the medium of transmission, noise could
include a mistyped letter, a crackle of static, or the roar of a passing
train.
Efficient transmission often calls for messages to be compressed,
an economy that can be accomplished in the process of encoding.3"
Advertisers in the classified section of the newspaper, who are
charged by the letter to transmit their messages, often practice the
art of compression, writing, for example, "a/c" instead of "air
conditioning" or "41k" instead of "41,000 miles on the odometer."
Such compression is possible because the English language as written
has significant redundancy, meaning that it employs more symbols
than are necessary to allow the message to be reconstructed."'

27. See id. at 25 ("This is a theory so general that one does not need to say what kinds
of symbols are being considered-whether written letters or words, or musical notes, or spoken
words, or symphonic music, or pictures.").
28. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 118 (discussing "meaningful language as a sort of
code of communication").
29. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 7 (referring to "noise" as "certain
things ...added to the signal which were not intended by the information source").
30. See id. at 75. Shannon discusses how "proper encoding" can take advantage of
statistical knowledge of the information source to reduce the required channel capacity. An
example is the use of the shortest Morse Code symbol, the dot, to stand for the most common
letter in the English language, e. Id.
31. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 143; RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 33. This can be
illustrated by reproducing only the consonants in a passage of text: ftn th txt cn stll b ndrstd.
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Compression by efficient coding is beneficial-fewer letters to
print, faster transmission times, lower bit rates-but the price comes
in greater vulnerability to noise. The redundancy of standard English
allows errors to be recognized and corrected more easily than would
be the case if the language were more "efficient." A typist who
strikes the x key when c was intended might produce "air
xonditioning," but chances are the message would still be correctly
understood; "a/x," on the other hand, if more efficient in terms of
the requirements of transmission, is less likely to be understood.32
As far as communications engineers are concerned, Shannon's
most significant work may be his insight into the theoretical limits of
error correction in relation to channel capacity. That, however, is not
what has fired the imagination of so many researchers in other fields.
What is exciting to them, because it seems at the same time
fundamental and bizarre, is the way Shannon equates information
with disorder.
Shannon approached signal transmission as a stochastic process,33
from the Greek word meaning "to guess." 34 This means that the
choice of each symbol in a message is governed by a set of
probabilities, which can be dependent (in the special case of a
Markoff process) on the occurrence of preceding symbols.3" As

Shannon formally defines "redundancy" as "one minus the relative entropy," the latter
referring to the "ratio of the entropy of the source [see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text] to the maximum value it could have while restricted to the same symbols." SHANNON &
WEAVER, supra note 22, at 13. Redundancy accounts for the attributes of a message
determined "by the accepted statistical rules governing the use of the symbols in question." Id.
Shannon estimated that the redundancy of common English is, at scales of structure
encompassing eight or fewer letters, about fifty percent. Id. As Weaver noted,
It is sensibly called redundancy, for this fraction of the message is in fact redundant
in something close to the ordinary sense; that is to say, this fraction of the message is
unnecessary (and hence repetitive or redundant) in the sense that if it were missing
the message would still be essentially complete, or at least could be completed.
Id.
32. Where correctness is particularly critical, redundancy may be added by repetition
("Now hear this! Now hear this!") or by other methods ("That's R as in Richard, E as in
Elephant, D as in David ....).
33. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supranote 22, at 11.
34. See JEREMY CAMPBELL, GRAMMATICAL MAN: INFORMATION, ENTROPY, LANGUAGE
AND LIFE 28 (1982).

35. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 11 ("A system which produces a
sequence of symbols (which may, of course, be letters or musical notes, say, rather than words)
according to certain probabilities is called a stochasticprocess, and the special case of a stochastic
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elements of a message are received, one by one, the recipient might
guess, based on those probabilities, what the next symbol is likely to
be. If the message symbols previously received were "i n f o r m a t i
o" the odds are high that the next symbol will be "n." On a smaller
scale, u is far more likely to follow q than any other letter in a
correctly transmitted message.36 Shannon found that the quantity of
information in a message, in terms of the demands of transmission, is
related to the distribution of probabilities among the possible
components of that message.
To take the simplest example, suppose that a message could
consist only of two symbols-one or zero, on or off, black or white.
Shannon used p and q,37 so to adapt his symbology let us imagine
that a sales clerk signals to a stockroom when a customer orders one
of the two available flavors of pie: "p" for peach or "q" for quince.
The transmission for a period of sales might look something like "p p
p p q p p p q p p p p." If nearly every customer ordered peach, one
could find ways to compress the stream of messages; for example, "q
q q q" might signify not the unheard-of event of four consecutive
orders of quince, but instead the routine event of 100 consecutive
orders of peach. On the other hand, if one noticed that ten
consecutive orders of one flavor were nearly always followed by ten
of the other, one could economize on the messages, taking
advantage of the characteristics of the Markoff process. One could
not compress the message, however, if orders of peach or quince
were equally likely and no predictions could be made based on prior
events.38

process in which the probabilities depend on the previous events, is called a Markoffprocess or a
Markoff chain.").
36. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 49.
37. Strictly speaking, Shannon used p and q to represent the probability that either
alternative would occur. Hence, the two alternatives could be x and y, with p representing the
probability of x and q representing the probability of y. However, it seems less confusing to
think of p (probability p) and q (probability q) as the two alternatives.
38. The message could not be compressed because it would already carry the maximum
possible information per symbol. If the code required three symbols for each pie order ("p p p"
for peach or "q q q" for quince), the information "density" of the messages would be reduced
by that redundancy. The messages would be less vulnerable to error, since a mistake could
more often be identified for what it was, but the messages would also be more predictable,
more redundant, and more demanding of time or other resources.

[2004
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Shannon produced the following graph,39 showing on the
horizontal axis the probability of the occurrence of p rather than q,
and on the vertical axis the quantity of information, expressed as H,
in a message communicating the event.
Figure2
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If the message is certain to be p rather than q, so that probability
p is 100%, then the information content of the message is zero. By

39. Reproduced from SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 50 fig. 7. The equation
for H (the quantitative measure of information in bits) is H = - (p log p + q log q), where p
and q are the probability of the two possible occurrences.
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the same token, if the message is certain not to be p (so that it is
certain to be the only other possibility, q) the information content of
the message is also zero.4" This much seems intuitively obvious: a
message that could only have one outcome is not a message- worth
sending. As the outcome becomes uncertain, the information
content of the message rises, reaching its peak (one "bit" of
information per symbol) where p and q are equally probable." If the
odds are biased in favor of p or q, the information content per
symbol is something less than one bit; the stream of symbols might,
with the right encoding, be compressed.42
Although this example posits only two possible messages, the
quantity of information can be raised by increasing the number of
possible messages. Like evening out the probabilities between
messages, increasing the number of potential messages increases the
uncertainty and, hence, increases H. 43 To put it concretely, "[a]
message which is one out of ten possible messages conveys a smaller
amount of information than a message which is one out of a million
possible messages." '
Shannon courted controversy by referring to H, the measure of
information present in the message, as "entropy"-a term borrowed
from the physical sciences.4 To a physicist, entropy refers to the
randomness, disorder, or shuffled-ness that arises as ordered physical
systems break down or unwind. 46 According to the second law of
thermodynamics, any closed physical system tends inevitably toward

40. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 51 ("[O]nly when we are certain of the
outcome does H vanish.").
41. See id. ("This is also intuitively the most uncertain situation.").
42. Although information is maximized when all possible code elements are equally
likely, that does not mean that the code elements in any particular message will be evenly
distributed. "H is always calculated for the distribution of elements in a typical message. It only
means that, in a sufficiently large random sample of messages drawn from the code set, the
distribution will tend toward equal probability." RITCHIE, supranote 1, at 33.
43. See id. at 5.
44. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 23.
45.

See

N.

KATHERINE

HAYLES,

CHAOS

BOUND:

ORDERLY

DISORDER

IN

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE AND SCIENCE 49 (1990) ("Rumor has it that von Neumann
told Shannon to use the word because 'no one knows what entropy is, so in a debate you will
always have the advantage.'").
46. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 12 ("[T]he tendency of physical
systems to become less and less organized, to become more and more perfectly shuffled, is so
basic that Eddington argues that it is primarily this tendency which gives time its arrow .... ").
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entropy, as does the universe as a whole.47 Mathematically,
Shannon's H looks just like entropy.4 8
To equate information with entropy, suggesting that the most
disordered message is the most information-laden message,4 9 is a
puzzling concept at first."0 It would seem that structure is required
to make a message "informative" in any conventional sense; a
completely disordered message could only be gibberish.
Furthermore, Shannon's measure of information implies that when
noise interferes with a message, disrupting its order in unpredictable
ways,"1 this actually adds information to the message rather than, as
we would imagine, subtracting information. 2 Suppose that, in our
hypothetical, customers ordered peach rather than quince ninetynine percent of the time, producing, in any particular instance, a
highly predictable message ("peach again"). If a short circuit
randomly flipped the intended p or q to its opposite, the odds of
receiving a q would rise, evening out the probabilities somewhat and
47. See STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 102, 144-45 (1990); 18
McGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 339-40 (8th ed. 1997).
48. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 12-14. Pierce, however, warns against
equating the entropy of information theory with the entropy of physics:
Once we understand entropy as it is used in communication theory thoroughly,
there is no harm in trying to relate it to the entropy of physics, but the literature
indicates that some workers have never recovered from the confusion engendered by
an early admixture of ideas concerning the entropies of physics and communication
theory.
PIERCE, supra note 19, at 80.
49. Ritchie notes,
In general, entropy refers to the degree of randomness or dispersion among elements
of some set .... Organization and structure constrain the order in which elements
may appear and hence make some elements more probable in certain positions. For
example, English spelling requires that each word have at least one vowel.
Consequently, H can also be considered a measure of disorganization: The more
organized a system, the lower the value of H.
RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 5.
50. Even Weaver, one of Shannon's greatest champions, admits that Shannon's theories
seem, at first, "disappointing and bizarre." SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 27. The
disappointment stems from the unwillingness to deal with meaning, as discussed infra note 56
and accompanying text.
51. See RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 53-54 ("'[N]oise,' in signal transmission theory,
refers to any random alteration in the signal. Thus, in a statistical sense, the more noise there is
in a channel, the more likely it is that elements in any string will have been randomly
altered .... ").
52. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 19 ("[I]f the uncertainty is increased
[by the addition of noise], the information is increased, and this sounds as though the noise
were beneficial!").
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causing the information content of the message to increase. 3 If noise
completely obscured the intended message, making it impossible for
anyone to tell whether the next symbol would be p or q, information
would be maximized---odd as that might seem to the customers who
kept receiving the wrong flavor of pie.
This paradoxical result 4 led some to equate information with
order, or negative entropy. 5 Shannon's willingness to link
information with disorder can be explained by his exclusion of
meaning from the equation. 6 When AT&T is considering how to
transmit messages accurately and efficiently, it is unlikely to concern
itself with what those messages signify. A message that is jumbled
nonsense is no easier to transmit; in fact, Shannon's reasoning
demonstrates that it is more difficult, or more demanding, to
transmit accurately. The unpredictability of a randomized message
means that compression is less feasible and that more resources are
necessary to guard against error.
In the context of transmission and retransmission, noise certainly
adds something to the message. If a highly ordered message is
transmitted from A to B (e.g., "p p q q p p q q p p q q p p q q p p q
q. .. ."), A could devise an efficient code to compact the message.

53. See RITCHIE, supranote 1, at 54 ("Noise is likely to increase the statistical variety of
the signal by equalizing the distribution of probabilities, because the more frequently used
elements are more likely to be affected by random processes .... "); SHANNON & WEAVER,
supra note 22, at 51-52 ("Any change toward equalization of the probabilities ... increases
H.-).
54. Ritchie maintains that increasing information by increasing noise is a "false
paradox," and he accuses Weaver of a "mistake" in equating H with "subjective uncertainty."
RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 53-54. H, according to Ritchie, has nothing to do with a recipient's
knowledge of the contents of a message, but is only "a statistical description of the distribution
of elements in a set." Id. Ritchie distinguishes between H and "information," which requires a
human context. Id. at 65-67. The debate is, at least in part, over proper terminology.
55. See COLIN CHERRY, ON HUMAN COMMUNICATION 216 (2d ed. 1966).
56. "The word information, in this theory, is used in a special sense that must not be
confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must not be confused with
meaning." SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 8; see also RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 5;
SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 31 ("The fundamental problem of communication is
that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another
point. Frequently messages have meaning, that is, they refer to or are correlated to some
system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication
are irrelevant to the engineering problem."). Jumarie holds that theories dealing only with the
transmission of symbols should be called "communication theory," whereas "information
theory" "should deal with both symbols and their meanings." JUMARIE, supra note 21, at 2.
Most works, however, still refer to Shannon's insights as a part of "information theory."
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If the message were sent in uncompacted form to B, and on the way
encountered noise that randomly changed many of the symbols, the
resulting jumble (e.g., "pp p q ppqp q pp q q q p q pp q .... )
would be far more difficult for B to compress. If the goal were for B
to understand the message transmitted by A, the change would be
undesirable-the message would be less "informative." ' But from
an engineer's perspective, taking into account the requirements of
channel capacity and encoding, the message would have gained
"information," as B would appreciate when attempting to retransmit
the message he received, noise and all, to C.
B. Information and Meaning
As Shannon noted in his first essay, messages generally do have
meaning: "[T]hey refer to or are correlated to some system with
certain physical or conceptual entities.""8 For example, a message
says "Mary called while you were away" because an entity known as
"Mary" performed the action known as "calling" while the condition
of the message recipient was "away." Shannon avoided semantic
issues because they were irrelevant to the engineering considerations.
If the message had said "Ypio cfsvwq while you were vzykg," it
would have been as demanding, if not more demanding, to
transmit.5 9 However, Shannon's insights suggested the discovery of a
new aspect of nature-"information"-as basic, perhaps, as energy
or time. Inevitably, other theorists began to consider how meaning
might be incorporated into Shannon's framework.
Referring to the strange conjunction of information and entropy
that Shannon had revealed, Warren Weaver expressed "the vague
feeling that information and meaning may prove to be something
like a pair of canonically conjugate variables in quantum theory, they
being subject to some joint restriction that condemns a person to the

57. Weaver distinguishes between "desirable" and "undesirable" information: "It is thus
clear where the joker is in saying that the received signal has more information. Some of this
information is spurious and undesirable and has been introduced via the noise. To get the
useful information in the received signal we must subtract out this spurious portion."
SHANNON & WEAVER, supa note 22, at 19.
58. Id.at 31.
59. See id. at 8 ("[T]wo messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning and the
other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent, from the present viewpoint, as
regards information.").
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sacrifice of the one as he insists on having much of the other., 60 In
other words, if a message included unpredictable twists, the entropy
of the message-and, consequently, its "information"-would
increase, but its intelligibility would suffer, and with it the capacity of
the message to convey meaning.
Shannon's example of Finnegans Wake ' suggests the trade-off.
When Joyce is in his stride, his prose resembles a random
concatenation of syllables, such as in this example: "The howsayto
itishwatis hemust whomust worden schall. A darktongues, kunning.
O theoperil! Ethinop lore, the poor lie. He askit of the hoothed
fireshield but it was untergone into the matthued heaven." 6 2 One
would find it difficult, based on familiar patterns or probabilities, to
condense that message. Compared to common English prose, it is
high in information and low in redundancy. It is also, for most
people, virtually meaningless.
On the other hand, too much pattern or predictability can also
impair the capacity of a message to convey meaning. A message that
endlessly repeats itself, for example, strikes the listener as dull
precisely because once the pattern is established the message has
nothing to say. As common sense suggests, the most effective
communication for conveying meaning is that which mixes order
and surprise. The familiar, predictable patterns orient the audience
and distinguish the message from noise;63 the unexpected variations

60. Id.at 28.
61. Shannon notes,
Two extremes of redundancy in English prose are represented by Basic English and
by James Joyce's book Finnegans Wake. The Basic English vocabulary is limited to
850 words and the redundancy is very high. This is reflected in the expansion that
occurs when a passage is translated into Basic English. Joyce on the other hand
enlarges the vocabulary and is alleged to achieve a compression of semantic content.
Id. at 56; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 71 ("James Joyce extended his freedom by
throwing overboard some of the rules of language in an exuberant search for novelty. In
Finnegans Wake, he allowed himself a much wider variety of possible messages than, say, Jane
Austen, who observed the rules more scrupulously.").
62. This example is borrowed from CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 71 (quoting JAMES
JOYCE, FINNEGANS WAKE 223 (Penguin Books 1999) (1939)). Indeed, Campbell himself, or
the preparers of the edition of FINNEGANS WAKE on which he relied, may have made some
mistakes in reproducing this brief passage. Cf.JOYCE, supra, at 223 (showing "itiswhatis"
instead of "itishwatis" and "Ethiaop" instead of "Ethinop"). Such mistakes are telling
illustrations of the link between information and entropy, as well as the vulnerability to noise of
messages with low redundancy. See CAMPBELL, supra, at 71-72.
63. See id. at 68-69 ("A written message is never completely unpredictable. If it were, it
would be nonsense. Indeed, it would be noise. To be understandable, to convey meaning, it
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give the message a purpose." In any event, the relationship between
meaning and information, as defined by Shannon, must be more
complex than a simple antithesis.
Attempts to incorporate meaning, or semantics, into information
theory rely on the idea that generating messages is a process of
selectionfrom a group of possible messages.6" If the symbol set consists
of p and q, and each message consists of a string of four symbols, the
message "q q p q" is one of sixteen possible messages. H, the
measure of "information," is maximized if each of those sixteen
messages is equally probable, as would be the case if the message
were randomly selected. H is minimized if the message is somehow
restricted to "q q p q" and nothing else. 66 At this point, it should be
emphasized that H is not so much a characteristic of a particular
message as it is a characteristic of the probabilities governing all
messages that a source might generate.67 As Weaver expresses it,
"this word information in communication theory relates not so
much to what you do say, as to what you could say."6 8 If you (the
message source) could say anything because the alternatives are
equally probable, what you do say carries maximum information. If
what you could say is restricted because the probabilities are skewed,
what you do say, in the long run, carries less information.
H can be approached in different ways, depending on whether
one views it from the perspective of the message source, the message

must conform to rules of spelling, structure, and sense, and these rules, known in advance as
information shared between the writer and the reader, reduce uncertainty.").
64. See id. at 28 ("[T]he whole point of a message, the whole point of writing the next
sentence in a book, is that it should contain something new, something unexpected. Otherwise
there would be no reason to write it in the first place.").
65. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 7 ("The information source selects a
desired message out of a set of possible messages .... The selected message may consist of
written or spoken words, or of pictures, music, etc.").
66. See id. at 15 ("In the limiting case where one probability is unity (certainty) and all
others zero (impossibility), then His zero (no uncertainty at all-no freedom of choice---no
information).").
67. See RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 31 ("[T]he value of H for each datum must be
calculated on the basis of the distribution of elements in the code, not on the basis of the
distribution of data in any particular message."); SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 9
("Note that it is misleading (although often convenient) to say that one or the other message
conveys unit information [i.e., one bit, when there are two equally probable messages]. The
concept of information applies not to the individual messages (as the concept of meaning
would), but rather to the situation as a whole .... ").
68. SHANNON &WEAVER, supra note 22, at 8.
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recipient, or the engineer responsible for operating the channel.
One's perspective seems to bear on the problem of incorporating
semantics into the broader framework of information. Shannon
adopts the more aloof engineer's perspective, which can ignore what
a message means. The only concern is the requirements of
transmission, which may be just as demanding for a meaningless
message. H, from this perspective, is a function of probability
distributions and the demands they place on coding and channel
capacity. 69
Weaver, on the other hand, often characterizes H as a measure of
freedom of choice, which suggests the perspective of the message
source. Thus, Weaver observes that "H is largest when the...
probabilities are equal (i.e., when one is completely free and
unbiased in the choice), and reduces to zero when one's freedom of
choice is gone." 7" He notes that more "choices" lead to increased
information: "There is more 'information' if you select freely out of a
set of fifty standard messages, than if you select freely out of a set of
twenty-five.", 7 ' H is maximized when all potential messages are
equally probable so that "one is completely free and unbiased in the
choice" and zero when the absolute certainty of one message means
that "one's freedom of choice is gone., 72 Finally, Weaver refers to
"redundancy" as "the fraction of the structure of the message which
is determined not by the free choice of the sender, but rather by the
accepted statistical rules governing the use of the symbols in
question."73 Weaver's characterization of H as a measure of "choice"
seems to interject a human presence, in comparison to Shannon's
more technically oriented perspective. It also seems consistent with

69. Ritchie treats H as solely a measure of "the information capacity of the code"
reflecting "the dispersion of elements in the code from which the message elements were
assembled." RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 54. Thus, "the observer's subjective uncertainty about
what message was sent" may be affected by noise in the channel, but the noise has no effect on
H. Id.
70. SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 15; see also PIERCE, supra note 19, at 105
("[I]n connection with the message source we think of the entropy as a measure of choice, the
amount of choice the source exercises in selecting the one particular message that is actually
transmitted.").
71.

SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 16.

72. Id. at 5.
73. Id.at 13.
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Weaver's inclination to distinguish
"undesirable" information.7 4

between

"desirable"

and

From the perspective of the message recipient, H may best be
characterized as a measure of uncertainty.7" If a particular message is
virtually inevitable (e.g., the pie order is almost always peach), the
message carries, in both the practical and the formal sense, little
information. The recipient, over the course of repeated messages,
seldom learns anything that the recipient did not already suspect
("peach again").7 6 If the probabilities are more nearly equal,
increasing the value of H, or if a broader variety of messages could
be received, then the recipient experiences increased uncertainty
prior to receiving the message.7 7 The uncertainty is maximized when
the content of the message is completely random and therefore
completely unpredictable-which also represents the maximum of
information in Shannon's terms.78 It is the same principle as before
but from a different point of view. As Weaver summarizes, "greater
freedom of choice, greater uncertainty, greater information go hand
in hand." 9
Once again, the uncertainty represented by H is a characteristic
of "the situation as a whole "80--i.e., the set of all possible messages
and their relative probabilities-rather than a characteristic of any

74. See supra note 57.
75. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 23.
76. See id. at 80 ("If the message source involved no choice, if, for instance, it could
produce only an endless string of ones or an endless string of zeros, the recipient would not
need to receive or examine the message to know what it was; he could predict it in advance.
Thus, if we are to measure information in a rational way, we must have a measure that increases
with the amount of choice of the source and, thus, with the uncertainty of the recipient as to
what message the source may produce and transmit.").
77. See id. at 23 ("The amount of information conveyed by the message increases as the
amount of uncertainty as to what message actually will be produced becomes greater ....The
entropy of communication theory is a measure of this uncertainty and the uncertainty, or
entropy, is taken as the measure of the amount of information conveyed by a message from a
source.").
78. See CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 63.
79. SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 18-19; see also PIERCE, supra note 19, at
81 ("[Entropy] increases as the freedom of choice (or the uncertainty to the recipient)
increases and decreases as the freedom of choice and the uncertainty are restricted. For
instance, a restriction that certain messages must be sent either very frequently or very
infrequently decreases choice at the source and uncertainty for the recipient, and thus such a
restriction must decrease entropy.").
80. SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 9.
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particular message. 8 Some who adopt the recipient's point of view
refer to the "surprisal" value of a message as a measure of the
information carried by that message.82 "Surprisal" is a function of
how far a particular message deviates from the expectations of the
recipient. If the probabilities are biased toward a particular message
("peach again"), the "surprisal" value of that message is low, but on
the rare occasions when the alternative message is received ("quince
this time!"), the "surprisal" value is high. In fact, it is higher than it
could be where all probabilities are equal. However, the rarity of the
surprising message in the skewed-probability situation means that, in
the long run, the equal-probability situation generates more
information.8 3
From the recipient's perspective, resolving uncertainty is, in John
R. Pierce's phrase, "the aim and outcome of communication." 84 The
message source chooses which of all possible messages to transmit,
and delivery removes the recipient's uncertainty as to which message
might have been received.8" The resolution of uncertainty is a
function not only of the message received but also of what the
recipient already knows: "the more we know about what message the
source will produce, the less uncertainty, the less the entropy, and
the less the information."86 It is generally presumed that the
recipient at least has prior knowledge of the code.87 A message in
81. Ritchie insists that "probabilities always refer to the general case, prior to any
observation, and cannot be calculated for a particular message that has already been observed."
RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 31.
82.

See FRED 1. DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION 10, 12

(CSLI Publ'ns 1999) (1981).
83. See id. at 12 ("Although, generally speaking, the greatest average information is
obtained when the possibilities are equally likely, the greatest surprisal values are to be
obtained when the possibilities are not equally likely.").
84. PIERCE, supranote 19, at 79.

85. See id. at 105 ("We think of the recipient of the message, prior to the receipt of the
message, as being uncertain as to which among the many possible messages the message source
will actually generate and transmit to him. Thus, we think of the entropy of the message source
as measuring the uncertainty of the recipient as to which message will be received, an
uncertainty which is resolved on receipt of the message.").
86. Id.at 23.
87. See RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 44 ("The selection of medium and code presupposes
an extensive prior exchange of information (during the design process), and the
communicative event cannot be fully understood without considering this preparatory
information. In effect, the advance exchange of information establishes the external structure
of the code, its relationship to the signal transmission system and to the meanings to be
communicated.").

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2004

Chinese would be highly unpredictable and, in the sense of
uncertainty, full of "information" to a recipient who had never
encountered the language. Every character would come as a
complete surprise. After receiving many messages in Chinese, the
recipient might begin to perceive the patterns that produce the
redundancy in any language--certain characters, for example,
would be more likely to appear together than certain other
characters. Eventually missing elements might be filled in with
reasonable confidence, even though, without some Rosetta-stone
equivalent, the recipient would never know what the messages
meant.
Even from Shannon's engineering point of view, the recipient's
prior knowledge is important in determining the requirements of the
communication channel. The term "a/c" can be more efficiently
substituted for "air conditioning" only if the intended recipient has
already learned the code, perhaps through some other channel. A
sufficiently elaborate code can permit highly efficient messages. The
symbol "1" could stand for the complete text of the King James
Bible. 9 Of course, one would pay the price for such efficiency by
having to deliver, one way or another, a very substantial code book.
The best prospect for incorporating meaning into information
theory is to adopt the recipient's perspective, treating H as a measure
of the recipient's uncertainty. Some information theorists, such as
Guy Jumarie, define information as the difference in the recipient's
uncertainty before and after receiving the message.90 That difference
depends upon the observer.9 1 Someone who did not speak Chinese
would have his uncertainty reduced only in a very superficial fashion
by receiving a copy of a Chinese newspaper-he could be certain of
the symbols in the document, but he would be no more enlightened

88. See supratext accompanying notes 31-32.
89. See SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 9.
90. See JUMARIE, supra note 21, at 46. Jumarie considers entropy a measure of
uncertainty and information a difference in entropy. Id. at 23,
91. See id. at 62 ("Basically, all information should be regarded as information relative
to a given observer, and the latter should appear as a parameter in the definition of this
information. One way to achieve this is to introduce semantics in the modelling of information
since this semantics is not constant but depends upon the observer who receives the
informational content of the message."). The observer's perspective can also change over time.
An observer who had no reason to doubt the fairness of a die would initially assume that the
chance of rolling a particular number was one out of six. If a series of trials revealed that the
die was loaded, the observer's expectations would change. See id. at 6-7.

69]

Copyrightand Information Theory

about the events described. On the other hand, a reader fluent in
Chinese would resolve her uncertainty about the world beyond the
symbols-assuming the document were trustworthy--because for
her the message would have meaning.9 2 Moreover, her prior
knowledge of the events described in the newspaper would enhance
her comprehension of its contents. 9 For Jumarie, "information" is
more of a relative and subjective concept, and it is incomplete unless
the idea of meaning is included. In fact, Jumarie, unlike Shannon,
introduces the concept of "negative information" to describe a
communication that leaves the recipient subjectively more uncertain
than before. 94
If "information" is defined from the point of view of a message's
capacity to resolve uncertainty, the influence of noise becomes less
paradoxical. Noise may increase the statistical variety of the messages
it affects, but, as L. David Ritchie argues, "It is never the case that
information increases as an observer becomes more uncertain about
what signal was actually transmitted, and it is certainly never true, as
Weaver claimed, that random perturbations in a signal ... can
somehow increase the information content of the signal." 9 This
point of view assumes that the only uncertainty the observer cares to
resolve is uncertainty about the message dispatched by the message
source-in other words, what did the source actually say? If the
observer, however, is uncertain about and interested in what the noise
itself may produce, treating the noise as though it were a message
source, then the noise would increase the information content of the
signal from this observer's point of view. This may seem a fine point,
but it will have some bearing on the discussion of alternative models

92. See id. at 66.
93. See id. at 7, 81 (discussing the example of a knowledgeable reporter who would
understand that a telegram referring to the "long stride of the civil servants" was intended to
read "long strike of the civil servants"). Campbell also uses the common examples of Japanese
as the unfamiliar language and economics combined with Japanese as the unfamiliar semantic
context. See CAMPBELL, supra note 34, at 63. If the message source is an economics lecture in
English, the message will be indistinguishable from noise to a Japanese speaker. To an English
speaker unfamiliar with economics, knowledge of the language will make the message better
understood, and in some respects more predictable. An English speaker familiar with
economics will understand the message best and will be surprised the least. Id.
94. See JUMARIE, supra note 21, at 23-24. Jumarie concludes that negative information
must be postulated before information theory can be applied in areas like "biology, linguistics,
[and] human sciences." Id.
95. RITCHIE, supranote 1, at 55.
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of authorship, which may be broad enough to embrace the
production of disordered or "noisy" texts.96
D.M. MacKay, not long after the publication of Shannon's
essays, attempted to integrate meaning into information theory by
adopting the subjective viewpoint of the message recipient. 97
MacKay defined the meaning of a message as the capacity of the
message to select among the possible internal states of the
recipient. 98 If you "catch my meaning," my message has
accomplished the desired alteration of your internal state. MacKay
referred to those internal states as the "conditional-probability matrix
or 'C.P.M."' of the receiver 99 -a rarified term that seems to refer
more appropriately to the speech of computers than to that of
human beings. It could refer, for example, to the recipient's
awareness of a visitor."' ° A message referring to the visitor selects the
corresponding state of the recipient's awareness, if the recipient is
not already aware of the facts.' 01 The potential of the message to
select that state is the "meaning" of the message. 0 2 A message is
"meaningless" if it cannot perform the selective function, either
because its terms are undefined or because its terms are internally
inconsistent. 03
'

96. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
97. D.M. MacKay, The Place of 'Meaning' in the Theory of Information, in
INFORMATION THEORY: PAPERS READ AT A SYMPOSIUM ON 'INFORMATION THEORY' HELD

AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTION, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 12TH TO 16TH 1955, at 215 (Colin

Cherry ed.) (1956).
98. See id. at 219.
99. Id. at 218-19.
100. See id. at 218 ("Let us now picture a communication process in which you send a
message (M) to me. For example, M might be 'Someone is waiting for you outside'. Now we
may assume that by sending M to me you intend to produce some effect on me.... What kind
of effect is this? Obviously it need not be an immediate change in my observable pattern of
behavior. What you are concerned with is my 'total state of readiness': in objective terms, the
set or matrix of conditional probabilities of different possible patterns of behavior in relevant
circumstances. For example, you want me when I leave the room to behave as if I expected to
find someone outside, and so forth.").
101. See id.
102. Id. at 219. MacKay is more technical and more rigorous than this paraphrase may
suggest. He defines the "meaning" of a message as "its selective function on a specified
ensemble" and holds that "[t]he selective information content of the message measures
logarithmically the size of the change brought about by its selective operation on the same
ensemble." Id. at 223.
103. See id. at 219 ("Correspondingly, we find two kinds of meaningless sentence. 'The
gups are plee' is meaningless to most of us for the first reason. 'The water is isosceles' is
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Meaning, according to this point of view, is not an absolute-it
can be judged only in relation to a particular message recipient. 104
What is meaningless to one recipient may be meaningful to
another,' and how a recipient perceives the meaning of a message
depends upon the recipient's internal state (or potential internal
states). 11 6 MacKay, and later Jumarie, suggests that observers
maintain some form of internal representation corresponding to the
observer's understanding of the world,"0 7 which can be altered by the
selective power of a meaningful message. If I believe that no visitors
are waiting for me, or if I have no information one way or the other,
a message that a visitor is waiting for me selects a new set of
expectations.10 8 Note that selection is a recurring theme in
information theory: "information" relates to the freedom of an

meaningless for the second. On the other hand, 'This stochastic process is stationary' is
probably meaningless to most of our fellow mortals for the first reason; and 'The radiation
from a horn-fed cheese' (actual title from a paper on Microwaves!) perhaps equally meaningless
for the second.").
104. See JUMARIE, supra note 21, at 78 ("[W]e may consider as a basic axiom the
statement that the meaning of a message is only a meaning relative to a given observer."). BarHillel, on the other hand, argues that "the concept of semantic information has intrinsically
nothing to do with communication. If an explication for this concept can be found, then the
proposition that all apples are red will carry a certain amount of information entirely
independently of whether a statement to this effect is ever transmitted." BAR-HILLEL, supra
note 21, at 287.
105. See MacKay, supra note 97, at 219.
106. See JUMARIE, supra note 21, at 63 ("A given set of symbols... may have different
significances to different observers depending upon the respective interests, that is to say the
respective internal states of these observers. If we discard this feature in modelling information,
we are missing an important property of human observers, and so we cannot expect to suitably
describe information processes involving human factors.").
107. See id. ("[I]n the general case, the observer mainly relies on a pre-existing internal
model that he has about the observable under consideration, i.e., a set of expectations.");
MacKay, supra note 97, at 221-22 ("[T]he range of ensembles to which a meaningful object
or event has a selective relationship by virtue of its meaning is restricted to those of
representational states. In the human organism, for example, we may presume that there are
certain internal states of the information-flow-system which constitute implicitly
representations of the subjects' world of activity, both conceptual and physical.").
108. This concept leaves room for inaccurate information, which would shift one's
expectations incorrectly, or even for fiction, where one knows that one is creating a
counterfactual model of reality. The important thing is that a meaningful message leads to
further inferences and internal representations. See MacKay, supra note 97, at 221. If one
learns that a character in a novel has been murdered, one's expectations for additional fictional
events is altered. The statement that the character has been murdered is, therefore, a
meaningful statement.
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information source to select among possible messages, °9 and
"meaning," according to MacKay, relates to the capacity of a
message to select among possible internal states of the recipient.
We have already seen that the information communicated by a
message source can be limited by the redundancy built into the
code."' If U inevitably follows Q, the messages employing that code
are more predictable--hence, they have lower entropy and, in terms
of H, less information. According to some information theorists,
patterns imposed by meaning also limit information. For example, in
the pie-ordering hypothetical, there is nothing in the code that
demands more p's than q's. It is the preference of the pie-ordering
public that causes "p" to predominate, thereby limiting the
information content of the messages."' Jumarie refers to two
entropies, one relating to symbols and the other relating to meaning,
that in conjunction determine the overall entropy of the message
source.112
II. ORIGINALITY AND EXPRESSION

Although it does not concern itself with information or meaning,
copyright law grapples with equally abstract and elusive concepts, such
as "originality," "creativity," and "idea" versus "expression." Part II of
this article discusses the role of these concepts in defining what can or
cannot be claimed as property, setting the stage for a potential union
between copyright's concept of authorship/originality and Shannon's
concept of "information."

109. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
111. Dretske offers biased coin flips and weather forecasts during monsoon season as
examples of circumstances giving rise to diminished information. DRETSKE, supra note 82, at 9.
112. See JUMARIE, supra note 21, at 101 ("[W]e shall characterize an informational
variable by means of two entropies: an entropy associated with the symbol of this variable, i.e.
the usual entropy, and a conditional entropy which describes its semantics."). Jumarie refers to
the two entropies as "syntactic entropy" and "semantic entropy." Id. at 102. See also John
Mingers, The Nature of Information and its Relationship to Meaning, in PHILOSOPHICAL
ASPECTS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 73, 75 (R.L. Winder et al. eds., Taylor & Francis 1997)
(1993) ("The information content of a message now depends on both the syntactic structure
of the symbols and the semantic structure of the observer. The syntactic information depends
on the number of possible symbols (e.g., words) and their probabilities of occurrence as usual.
But now, each word may have a number of different meanings and each will have a conditional
probability dependent on the particular observer. There is thus an additional uncertainty term
in the Shannon formulae.").
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Part II.A explores the goals of copyright, which include the
dissemination of knowledge for the public benefit. Part II.B discusses
the fundamental copyright "dichotomies" that define the realm of
copyrightable subject matter. Part II.C highlights existing similarities
in the area of "merger" between copyright doctrine and the
principles of information theory discussed in Part I.
A. Copyright Goals
The Constitutional basis for copyright protection lies in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8, which empowers Congress to "promote the
Progress of Science ...

by securing for limited Times to Authors...

the exclusive Right to their ... Writings."' 3 "Science," according to
historians, referred to all forms of knowledge or learning, not merely
those that would be called "science" today. 1 4 "Writings" has never
been confined to its narrowest sense. The earliest copyright statutes
included maps and charts as copyrightable subject matter,"' and
other forms of expression, such as music, photographs, and
choreography, have gradually been added to the list." 6 Until the
term expires, the owner of a copyright possesses the exclusive right
to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, or display the copyrighted
work." 7 The term of copyright, which has lengthened with new
legislation, is currently the life of the author plus seventy years." 8
Initially, copyright is awarded to the author of the work," 9 though
the author may assign his rights to others. 2 °

113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Parallel language in the same clause, referring to the
"Discoveries" of "Inventors" and the progress of the "Useful Arts," forms the constitutional
basis for patent law. See Alan L. Durham, 'Useful Arts' in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L.
REv. 1419, 1424-26.
114. See Karl B. Lutz, Patentsand Science: A Clarificationofthe Patent Clauseof the U.S.

Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50, 51 (1949); Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a
Standard ofPatentability,48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 5, 11-12 (1966).

115. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56-57 (1884).
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (listing categories of copyrightable material).
117. See id. § 106. Those rights are limited by principles such as fair use, see id. § 107,
and first sale, see id. § 109.
118. Id. § 302(a)-(c). Copyright in "anonymous works, pseudonymous works and works
made for hire" expires 95 years after publication or 120 years after creation, whichever comes
first. Id. § 302(c).
119. Id. §201(a).

120. Id. § 201(d).
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The reason for granting exclusive rights to copyrighted works is
that expressed in the Constitution: they are granted in order to
promote the "progress of science," or, in other words, to stimulate
the growth of the nation's intellectual life. The period of exclusive
rights permits the authors of valuable works to reap their rewards in
the marketplace."' Since works of authorship are typically more
expensive to create than to reproduce, the labor and inspiration of
authors might not be recouped if copyright did not assure authors,
at least for a limited period of time, an exclusive market for their
works. Without exclusive rights, authors would have less incentive to
create, and the consuming public, as a result, would enjoy fewer
works of expression or works of lesser quality.
As courts have assured us on many occasions, copyright exists for
the benefit of the public. 22 Copyright is not, primarily, a means for
defending the natural rights of authors. The interests of authors and
the interests of the public generally coincide; however, because
copyright is a property right, there is always potential conflict
between those who own and those who are excluded. Moreover, it is
in the nature of expression, and the development of culture in any
form, that the new builds upon the old. 123 In literature, music, or the
visual arts, we can trace influences or substantial borrowings forward
or backward in time. Few artists are not part of a "tradition," and
few authors-particularly authors who produce works based on
fact-rely entirely on their own materials. Advancements in
intellectual matters would be greatly hindered if every borrowed idea
1 24
or scrap of data had to be compensated or reinvented.
Consequently, ensuring the "progress" of knowledge and culture
requires consideration not only of the rights and rewards of today's
author but also of the freedom of tomorrow's author to continue the
process.15
121. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of
knowledge a fair return for their labors.").
122. See, e.g., id. ("'The monopoly created by copyright ... rewards the individual author
in order to benefit the public."' (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
123. See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Intellectual (and
artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on the work of others. No one invents
even a tiny fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural heritage.").
124.

See id.at 1540-41.

125. As Judge Easterbrook observed,
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If copyright law is to benefit the public as intended, it must
balance the opposing tugs of author incentive and consumer access.
An example of that trade off is the "fair use" exception to copyright
infringement, which permits the reproduction of small portions of
copyrighted works in such contexts as education, news reporting,
and critical analysis.' 26 For our purposes, the most important instance
of compromise is embodied in the concepts of "expression" and
"originality."
B. CopyrightDichotomies
One of the fundamental principles of copyright law is that an
idea cannot be copyrighted;' 2 7 only an author's original expression of
an idea can be copyrighted. The most famous discussion of the
"idea/expression dichotomy" is contained in Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corp.,12 where the plaintiff,
author of a play entitled Abie's Irish Rose, accused the defendant's
motion picture, The Cohens and the Kellys, of copyright infringement.
The works were similar in their outlines--both involved a romance
between a Catholic and a Jew and the animosity between their
respective families-but the stories differed in significant details.
Judge Hand framed the distinction between idea and expression in
terms of specificity. In a frequently quoted passage, he observed that
[u]pon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and

more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at

At each instant some new works are in progress, and every author is simultaneously a
creator in part and a borrower in part. In these roles, the same person has different
objectives. Yet only one rule can be in force. This single rule must achieve as much
as possible of these inconsistent demands.
Id. at 1541.
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Parody is another example of creative expression that
depends on the use (generally unauthorized use) of existing works. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994) ("[T]he heart of any parodist's claim to quote
from existing material ... is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create
a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author's works .... Parody needs to mimic
an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or
collective victims') imagination ....").
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea ....").
128. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to29which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
The "ideas" of the plaintiffs work-the broader aspects of the
story, included in the more general descriptions or higher "levels of
abstraction"--could not be copyrighted, even if those ideas were
original. Although the author "discovered the vein, she could not
keep it to herself."' 3 ° She could copyright only the particular manner
in which those ideas were expressed. That is not to say that only
3
word-for-word plagiarists are guilty of appropriating expression.1 1
Expression might include, in a literary work, such things as settings,
character traits, and plot twists. In Nichols, Judge Hand determined
that the similarities were too general to be characterized as anything
other than similarities of idea.'3 2
The "levels of abstraction" analysis is not so much a test of
copyrightability as a starting point. 33 Judge Hand did not venture to
say where expression fades into idea "as more and more of the
incident is left out."' 34 Referring to that "essential question," Judge
Easterbrook observed that "[a]fter 200 years of wrestling with
copyright questions, it is unlikely that courts will come up with the
answer anytime soon, if indeed there is 'an' answer, which we
doubt."3 5 The difficulty is not a philosophical one, although terms
like "idea" and "expression" have an epistemological dimension; for
purposes of copyright, the distinction is largely a matter of policy. 3 6
In other words, bearing in mind the objective of intellectual progress
and the need to balance access and incentive, a court determines
what aspects of the copyrighted work should be reserved as the
129. Id. at 121.
130. Id.at 122.
131. Id. at 121 (noting that copyright "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a
plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations").
132. Id.at 121-22.
133. See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
134. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.)
("Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the
'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression."').
135. Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540.
136. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No 'Sweat'? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 346 (1992).
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author's exclusive property and what aspects should be consigned to
the public domain-the former it dubs "expression" and the latter
instinctual than otherwise, and the
"idea."') 3 7 The analysis is more
38
results inevitably "ad hoc."
A parallel dichotomy contrasts "fact" and "expression." In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,139 the Supreme
Court considered whether a telephone company could use copyright
law to prevent a rival from duplicating its white-pages telephone
listings. In an opinion marked by strong rhetoric, the Court recalled
"[t]he most fundamental axiom of copyright law"' 4 ° that "'[n]o
author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates."'1 4 1 Facts
cannot be copyrighted because they are not "original"; that is, "facts
do not owe their origin to an act of authorship."' 4 2 Facts are
discovered, not created. 43 The Court called originality the "the sine
qua non of copyright"'" and held that the Constitution itself, by its
reference to "authors" and "writings," mandates originality in
far as copyright law is concerned, "'facts
copyrightable works. 4 As
46
are free for the taking.""11
This does not mean that factual works such as histories or news
reports can be copied at will. If the author of the work "clothes [the]
facts with an original collocation of words"' 4 7 -that is, if the author
expresses the facts in her own fashion, as historians or journalists
inevitably do-subsequent authors must confine their borrowing to
the facts themselves. They must avoid using the first author's
"expression," which does "owe [its] origin" to the creative faculties
137. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971) ("At least in close cases, one may suspect, the classification the court selects may simply
state the result reached rather than the reason for it.").
138. Peter Pan Fabrics,274 F.2d at 489.
139. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
140. Id. at 344.
141. Id. at 345 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985)).
142. Id. at 347.
143. Id. ("The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to find
and record a particular fact has not created that fact; he or she has merely discovered its
existence.").
144.

Id. at 348.

145. Id. at 346.
146.

Id. at 349 (quoting Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright

Protection of Works ofInformation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1868 (1990)).
147. Id. at 348.
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of the author. Like the idea/expression dichotomy, the
48
fact/expression dichotomy can be easier to state than to apply.
When the work is a bare compilation of facts, like a telephone
directory, there is little room for expression and hence little that can
be protected by copyright. 149 Then the "only conceivable
expression," and the only aspect of the work eligible for copyright
protection, "is the manner in which the compiler has selected and
arranged the facts."' 5 °
Even though selection and arrangement can provide the
necessary element of originality,'' the Feist Court held that plaintiff
Rural's telephone directory fell short. Here the Court introduced the
notion of "creativity" as an aspect of originality:
[O]riginality is not a stringent standard; it does not require that
facts be presented in an innovative or surprising way. It is equally
true, however, that the selection and arrangement of facts cannot
be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity
whatsoever.
5 2
The standard of originality is low, but it does exist.'
Rural's directory was "entirely typical" and "garden-variety."' 5 3 The
"selection" of information "could not be more obvious."'' 5 4 Rural
published only what one would expect in any telephone
directory-the names of subscribers, arranged alphabetically, and
their telephone numbers. Although preparing the directory required
"'selection' of a sort," Rural's actions "lack[ed] the modicum of
creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable
expression.""'

148. One of the difficulties lies in the problematic distinction between fact and opinion.
See Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion, and the Originality Standard of
Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 838-40 (2001).
149. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 ("Where the compilation author adds no written
expression but rather lets the facts speak for themselves, the expressive element is more
elusive.").
150. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000) ("The copyright in a compilation ...
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material.").
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "compilation").
152. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.

Copyright and Information Theory
Similarly, Rural could not prevail on the claim that its
"coordination" or "arrangement" of the facts was sufficiently
original to sustain a claim of copyright:
The white pages do nothing more than list Rural's subscribers in
alphabetical order. This arrangement may, technically speaking,
owe its origin to Rural; no one disputes that Rural undertook the
task of alphabetizing the names itself. But there is nothing remotely
creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages
[telephone] directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a
matter of course. It is not only unoriginal, it is practically
inevitable. This time-honored tradition does not possess the
minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the
Constitution.'56
Even where expression includes the requisite "spark" of
creativity, there are occasions where idea and expression or fact and
expression cannot be disentangled. In those cases, the expression
"merges" with the idea or the fact, rendering even the expression
ineligible for copyright protection. Merger occurs when there are so
few ways to express a simple fact or idea that exclusive rights to
particular manners of expression would soon exhaust the
possibilities. Such exhaustion would have a practical effect similar to
copyrighting the fact or idea itself.
In Herbert Rosenthaljewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,17 the plaintiff's
copyrighted work was a jeweled pin in the form of a bee. The
defendant's work was similar, though not identical.'
Even if the
defendant had copied from the plaintiff's work, a fact that was far
from evident, the court held that the "idea" of a jeweled bee pin
could be freely copied. 5 9 The plaintiff itself conceded that only its
"expression" of that idea could be protected. 60 The Ninth Circuit
found, however, that the idea and its expression were
"indistinguishable." 16 ' The similarities between the two pins were
"inevitable from the use of jewel-encrusted bee forms in both," 16' a
156. Id. at 363 (internal citation omitted).
157. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
158.

See id. at 741.

159.

Id. at 742.

160. Id.
161.

Id.

162. Id.
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conclusion reinforced by the inability of the plaintiffs counsel to
suggest any manner in which a jeweled bee pin could be fashioned
without infringing the plaintiff's copyright.' 63 "When the 'idea' and
its 'expression' are thus inseparable," the court held, "copying the
'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in
such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the
copyright owner....""
In Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,6s the First Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld summary judgment for the defendant, whom the
plaintiff accused of infringing its copyright on the written rules of a
simple sweepstakes contest. The two versions of the rules were,
indeed, very similar--so much so that copying would be difficult to
dispute.' 66 Nevertheless, the court denied the claim because the
substance or "idea" of the contest could be monopolized by
appropriating the very few ways of expressing the rules:' 67 "We
cannot recognize copyright
as a game of chess in which the public
168
checkmated.'
be
can
Whether idea and expression merge depends upon how the idea
is defined. The more general the idea, the more ways there are in
which the idea can be expressed. If the idea of the pin in Herbert
Rosenthal were described simply as "a jeweled pin in the shape of an
animal," the possibilities for expression would be boundless. Pins in
the shape of snails, zebras, whales, or hummingbirds could all be
characterized as expressions of that idea, and the defendant could
hardly complain that the similarities in two bee-shaped pins were
inevitable. Conversely, if the idea were described, hypothetically, as
"a one-inch pin in the shape of a common honey bee, fashioned
from contrasting bands of gold and silver, including a one-carat
diamond on each 'wing' and three one-half-carat diamonds arranged
163. Id. at 740.
164. Id. at 742.
165. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
166. See id. at 678.
167. The court noted,
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic
necessarily requires" if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting
a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the
substance.
Id. (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 679.

Copyright and Information Theory
longitudinally on the bee's 'thorax,"' the room for variation, and
hence expression, would be comparatively limited. Any pin that met
that description might look the same to a jury. Thus, the higher one
proceeds up the "levels of abstraction" scale, and the more
"incident" one leaves out in defining the idea of the work, the less
danger there is of merger. In Herbert Rosenthal, the court settled on
the middle ground of "jeweled bee pin," which is what the plaintiff
seemed to claim as its exclusive preserve. 69
Merger of fact and expression may also occur if there is only a
small number of ways in which a fact can be expressed. Here merger
is conceptually simpler because levels of generality are irrelevant. One
would not distinguish, for example, between a "high-level" fact
(e.g., "sequoias are large trees") and a detailed, "low-level" fact
(e.g., "the 'General Sherman' sequoia is 274.9 feet tall and its trunk
is 102.6 feet in circumference at the base"). Even a very specific fact
is, in the Feist sense, "unoriginal" and in the public domain. Note
that merger is contextual: if one makes a jeweled bee pin, there are a
limited number of ways to do it; if one adopts the rules of a
particular sweepstakes contest, there are a limited number of ways to
explain them. For policy reasons, copyright doctrine does not force
new authors to seek new contexts-new facts or new ideas-for their
own expression. It is more important that those facts and ideas be
available to the public from multiple sources.
C. Comparisonsto Information Theory
Where there is little room for expression, we could also say there
is little room for "information," or a situation low in "entropy."
Weaver characterized information as a measure of what one "could
say"' 7° -the fewer distinctive messages one can send, the lower the
value of H."' Similarly, the narrower the range of "messages" from
which an author can choose to communicate a particular idea, the
closer one comes to merger. One can speak, in both instances, in
terms of freedom: as H "reduces to zero when [the message
sender's] freedom of choice is gone, ' so an author's bid to
produce protectable expression "reduces to zero" when there is only
169.
170.
171.
172.

HerbertRosenthal, 446 F.2d at 742.
SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 8.

See

PIERCE,

supra note 19, at 23.

SHANNON & WEAVERt, supra note 22, at 15.
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one way to express an idea and the author's "freedom of choice is
gone."
H, as previously discussed,' is a product not only of the number
of messages one could transmit but also of the distribution of
probabilities among those possible messages. H increases as the
probabilities even out,174 and it is maximized when the message
source is "as little as possible driven toward some certain choices
which have more than their share of probability. 1 7 ' A counterpart in
copyright doctrine is what Feist refers to as "creativity." The
information in a telephone directory could be arranged in countless
ways---most of them completely useless. It is far more probable, for
reasons of custom and utility, that a directory will be arranged in the
conventional alphabetical-by-last-name fashion than in any other
manner. Feist described that arrangement as "entirely typical"' 176 and
indeed "practically inevitable"' 77-- anguage indicative of an
arrangement having much more than its "fair share of probability."
The arrangement is "so commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course"178-- exactly what one might say of
the information-impoverished peach pie orders discussed in the
earlier hypothetical.' 79
Information is reduced when messages are transmitted in a
comparatively "redundant" code. 8

Compared to the telegraphic

style of classified advertisements, a message composed in standard
English prose communicates a less concentrated form of
information. Many of the choices-such as which letter follows
which letter, or which word follows which word-are dictated more
by the conventions of the language than by the free choice of the
message sender. Information is reduced because "entropy" is
reduced. Syntactic conventions also limit the author's expression. If
the ideas to be communicated are simple and the occasion calls for
straightforward, conventional language, it is more difficult for an
author to find room for variation. Theoretically, this is within the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
See supratext accompanying note 43.
SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 15.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
Id. at 363.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 76.
See supranote 31 and accompanying text.
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control of the author; the rules of a sweepstakes contest could be
communicated with a Joyce-like freedom of language ("0
purchaseproofl 0 sending selfaddressed!"), or the compilers of a
telephone directory could decree that Baker will precede Able.
Generally, however, custom and practicality limit the available means
of expression, dictating a more redundant, less flexible code.
Information is further limited by patterns in the data. A message
sender reporting the results of biased coin tosses (producing "heads"
more often than "tails" or vice versa) transmits less information than
one who reports the results of an honest coin toss..81 Here
information and authorship diverge, at least if information is
regarded from the perspective of the recipient. If information is a
function of the recipient's pre-message uncertainty, a report
consisting of unknown and unpredictable facts would be rich in
information, even if the report's "originality," in the Feist sense of
author contribution, were low. The concept of "conditional
entropy," discussed more fully in the next section, 82 might provide a
better parallel to originality in factual works. One form of
conditional entropy describes the variability added to a message
when it is transmitted through a noisy channel--something
comparable, perhaps, to what happens when an author
communicates a fact.
One should not make too much of these similarities. Legal
constructs like originality cannot be reduced to mathematical
abstractions, nor is it likely that creativity will ever be expressed in
bits. On the other hand, the principles of information theory
necessarily apply to the kinds of works that authors create and that
copyright protects, whether they consist of written symbols, musical
83
notes, pictorial representations, or other means of expression.1
Information theory is "deep enough so that the relationships it
reveals indiscriminately apply to all these and to other forms of
communication."'' 1 4 It is tempting, therefore, to imagine a more
explicit union between information theory and the legal concept of
authorship, which takes as its starting point the existing parallels
between Shannon's theories and standard copyright doctrine.

181.

See DRETSKE, supra note 82, at 11-12.

182. See infra text accompanying note 237.
183.

See SHANNON &WEAVER, supra note 22, at 25.

184.

Id.
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In the next section, I will consider what a new model of
authorship inspired by information theory might look like and how it
could serve as an "unromantic" alternative to the traditional
"romantic" model.
III. "ROMANTIC" AND "UNROMANTIC" AUTHORSHIP
A. The "RomanticModel"
The romantic model of authorship regards an author's creative
powers as self-generated, mysterious, and "magical.""1 ' The author's
creative powers are so profoundly personal, so intimately associated
with the deepest recesses of the author's personality, that the works
they inspire are inevitably unique. They reveal "the hand of the
master." As Jessica Litman explains,
The expression is unique because the real author is using words,
musical notes, shapes, or colors to clothe impulses that come from
within her singular inner being. This mysterious inner being may
be the repository of impressions, experiences, and the works of
other authors, but the author's individual sensibility recasts that
86
raw material into something distinct and unrecognizable.'

According to historian Martha Woodmansee, the predominant
notion of an author as a self-inspired genius is of relatively recent
origin."8 7 Until the romantic movement of the eighteenth century,
authors, including artists and composers, were more commonly
viewed as skilled craftsmen in their more earth-bound moments or as
divine instruments when their efforts surpassed the ordinary.' A
new emphasis on individualism,8 9 perhaps fueled by the increasing
freedom of authors to support themselves by means other than
185. Litman, supra note 6, at 1008.
186. Id. (citations omitted); see also Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:
The Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author," 17 EIGHTEENTHCENTURY STUD. 425, 429 (1984).
187. Woodmansee, supra note 186, at 426.
188. Id. at 427 ("It is noteworthy that in neither of these conceptions is the writer
regarded as distinctly and personally responsible for his creation.").
189. See Jaszi, supra note 7, at 455 ("During the eighteenth century, 'authorship'
became intimately associated with the Romantic movement in literature and art, expressing 'an
extreme assertion of the self and the value of individual experience ... together with the sense
of the infinite and the transcendental.'" (alteration in original) (quoting THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE 842 (M. Drabble ed., 5th ed. 1985))).

69]
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patronage,1 90 gave birth to the more "romantic" conception.' 91 No
longer a "vehicle of preordained truths-truths as ordained either by
universal human agreement or by some higher agency-the writer
became an author (Lat. auctor, originator, founder, creator)."' 1 92 Of
course, such rhetoric is best applied to the greatest writers, artists,
and composers; few authors stand out from their peers, much less
scale the pinnacle of genius. The romantic model defines authorship
chiefly in terms of the ideal.
The romantic model of authorship can be restated in the
language of information theory. The mind of the author is the
message source. The work is the message, and its purpose is to convey
the sender's intentions to the awaiting audience. The author's
interpretation of the message is preemptive, "because it is the
author's genius, the author's special knowledge, which created this
[message] ex nihilo." 9 ' The audience is no more interested in
forming an individualized interpretation of the message than a
person calling information would be interested in an individualized
interpretation of a telephone number. The audience only wants to
resolve its uncertainty as to the author's meaning. If the message is
corrupted by noise, which could be defined as any aspect of the
message that was not intended by the author, the added information
is of the kind that Weaver describes as "undesirable,"' 94 and Jumarie
as "negative information." 9 ' By obscuring the author's intentions,
noise could only increase the audience's uncertainty.
Various aspects of copyright doctrine show the influence of the
romantic ideal of authorship. Feist, for example, adopts the
traditional definition of authors as "originator[s]" and "maker[s]."' 96
Copyrightable writings are the "'original intellectual conceptions of

190. See Woodmansee, supra note 186, at 426 ("In my view the 'author' in its modern
sense is a relatively recent invention. Specifically, it is the product of the rise in the eighteenth
century of a new group of individuals: writers who sought to earn their livelihood from the sale
of their writings to the new and rapidly expanding reading public.").
191. Litman, supra note 6, at 1008.
192. Woodmansee, supra note 186, at 429.
193. James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers,37 AM.
U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1988).
194. SHANNON &WEAVER, supra note 22, at 19.
195. JUMARIE, supra note 21, at 100.
196. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (quoting
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 58 (1884)).
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the author,' "' 9 7 the "'fruits of [the author's] intellectual labor,'."...
the embodiment of "'intellectual production, of thought, and
conception."" 99 The principle most emphasized in Feist is that
authorship comes from within: it is creation, not discovery.2 °° On
other occasions, the Supreme Court has observed that an author's
work inevitably reflects the "singular inner being" that gave it birth.
In Bleistein v. Donaldson LithographingCo.,2 ' the Court rejected the
argument that copyrightable works must reach high levels of
aesthetic merit. The Court reached this conclusion, in part, because
even rather pedestrian works, such as the circus posters at issue in
Bleistein, embody "the personal reaction of an individual upon
nature., 20 2 "Personality," the Court said, "always contains
something unique."20 3 An author's personality "expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in
it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something
he may copyright ....
A more recent case suggests that the infusion of personality is
not only inevitable, even in a "very modest grade of art," but
necessary before a work can be considered a copyrightable work of
authorship. In Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., °s the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the copyrightability of Mitel's "command codes"
used to access the features of a telecommunications system. The
court affirmed the denial of Mitel's request for a preliminary
injunction, in part because the codes had been assigned arbitrarily to
their respective functions:
Mitel's own witnesses testified to the arbitrariness of the command
codes. Scott Harper, a Mitel marketer ... testified that he selected
the numbers arbitrarily, without any attempt to place his mark on
them.... [P]laintiffs own expert testified that Mitel's registers

197. Id. (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
198. Id. (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
199. Id. at 347 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic
200. Id. ("[Flacts do not owe their origin to an act
between creation and discovery .....
201. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
202. Id. at 250.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Sarony, 111 U.S. 58 (1884)).
Sarony, 111 U.S. 58 (1884)).
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 58 (1884)).
of authorship. The distinction is one
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were arbitrary and "real close to random," and that there is no
evidence of anyone trying to "put their mark" on the codes.2 °6

Because the purported author of the Mitel command codes failed to
"put his mark" on those codes, the court could not find "'enough
20 7
originality to distinguish authorship.'
Authorship, in other words, does not occur unless the author's
"singular inner being" and "individual sensibility" manifest
themselves in the work, at least in some minimal degree. This is true,
apparently, even when the work is not of a kind that places a
premium on "personality."
Section 106(A) of the Copyright Act, enacted in 1990, allows
the authors of certain works of visual art 2° s to assert their rights to
"attribution" and "integrity." The author can "claim authorship of
the work" and prevent misattribution where the author did not
create the work. 209 Authors can also prevent the use of their names
on works that have been subject to "distortion, mutilation, or other
modification.., which would be prejudicial to [the author's] honor
or reputation."2 10 Under limited circumstances, authors can even
prevent such "distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of their
works or the destruction of a "work of recognized stature., 211 One
could justify these provisions under a conventional public-benefits
theory; protecting the honor and reputation of artists encourages
artists to produce copyrightable works for the ultimate benefit of the
public. But the protections speak more directly to the romantic
notion that an author's work is inseparable from his unique
personality-so much so that mistreatment of the work constitutes
mistreatment of the author.

206. Id. at 1373-74 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 1374 (citation omitted).
208. The protected works include paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and
photographs in limited editions. Books, periodicals, motion pictures, advertising art, works for
hire, and works produced in large editions (more than 200 copies) are specifically excluded. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
209. Id. § 106A(a)(1).
210. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
211. Id. § 106A(a)(3). Some of the limitations of that right are set forth at 17 U.S.C.
§ 113(d) (2000).
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B. Challenges to the "Romantic Model"

Although the romantic model of authorship remains a significant
undercurrent in copyright law,2 12 postmodernist literary scholars have
challenged the traditional emphasis on the author as the focus of
criticism. They view art as a more collaborative endeavor, wherein
the audience is at least as important as the creator. The "text," they
maintain, "is created not in the act of writing but in the act of
reading.,

21 3

In the words of Roland Barthes,

The removal of the Author ...is not merely an historical fact or an

act of writing; it utterly transforms the modern text (or-which is
the same thing--the text is henceforth made and read in such a way
that at all its levels the author is absent). The temporality is
different. The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as
the past of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a
single line divided into a before and an after. The Author is thought
to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before it, thinks,
suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his
work as a father to his child. In complete contrast, the modern
scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped
with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject
with the book as predicate; there is no other time than that214of the
enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now.
The "text" is not a reflection of individual genius but an artifact
of its cultural environment, a "multi-dimensional space in which a
variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash."21 5
Consequently, the text has no "single 'theological' meaning (the
'message' of the Author-God)., 216 The "meaning" of the text is
217
whatever we, the audience, find in it.

212. See Ginsburg, supra note 146, at 1867 ("[Tlhe personality concept of copyright
continues--often subconsciously, but certainly pervasively--to inform our ideas about
copyright today, too often to the exclusion of competing models of copyright.").
213. Jaszi, supra note 7,at 458 n.9 (quoting BARTHES, supranote 10, at 159).
214. BARTHES, supra note 10, at 145.
215. Id. at 146 ("The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres
of culture.").
216. Id.
217. See Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES
IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141, 143 (Josue Harari ed., 1979) ("It is a very familiar
thesis that the task of criticism is not to bring out the work's relationships with the author, nor
to reconstruct through the text a thought or experience, but rather, to analyze the work

Copyright and Information Theory
In parallel fashion, some copyright scholars have called for
reduced emphasis on the author/genius, recognizing that authors do
not, as a rule, produce their works ex nihilo. As Professor Litman
observes, "authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the
sea." 2'18 Excessively romantic notions of authorship may lead to
copyright laws that are too restrictive, denying the public the benefit
of new works produced from the "blend and clash" of existing
texts.2" 9 If, for example, one regards West Side Story as a product of
original genius, one may have little sympathy for a subsequent
author who recasts the story in a contemporary urban setting. But if
one recalls that West Side Story is itself an adaptation of Romeo and
Juliet--Shakespeare's version of yet another play-the continuation
of the work's evolution in a subsequent text seems less objectionable.
When storytelling is viewed as a continuing, collaborative process,
the rights of the individual storyteller pale in comparison to the
rights of the community.
In many respects, copyright doctrine already distances itself from
the romantic model of authorship. Courts have long held that the
purpose of copyright is to serve the consuming public, not to defend
the rights of authors in their singular personalities or their creative
labors. Copyright laws exist "[t]o promote the Progress of Science,"
meaning knowledge. 220 While "[t]he immediate effect of...
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor," the "ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.",221 Except, perhaps, in the

through its structure, its architecture, its intrinsic form, and the play of its internal
relationships.").
218. Litman, supra note 6, at 966 ("To say that every new work is in some sense based
on the works that preceded it is such a truism that it has long been a clich6, invoked but not
examined." (citations omitted)). Allusion to or borrowing from prior works is particularly
characteristic of postmodernism. See Kevin J.H. Dettmar, The Illusion of Modernist Allusion
and the Politics of Postmodern Plagiarism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN APOSTMODERN WORLD 99, 104-05 (Lise Buranen & Alice M.
Roy eds., 1999).
219. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
221. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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limited case of "moral rights," the rights of authors are derivative
and secondary to the interests of the public.
Copyright law, like contemporary literary theory, often
emphasizes the work at the expense of the author. 223 For example,
authors who have been assigned copyrights can be prevented from
creating works similar to those they have previously made.224 The
work corresponding to the assigned copyright defines an
"imaginative territory" from which even the author can be excluded,
thereby limiting the continued exercise of the author's creative
genius. 2225 In the case of an assignment one can at least imagine a
deliberate and lucrative relinquishment of the author's rights.
However, when the work is a "work for hire," the "inner being"
from which it sprang never enjoys the legal status of "author"; the
employer is considered the "author" of the work.226 The
employer/author is hardly a romantic notion; it recalls the preromantic conception of authors as instruments--4nspired workmen
or skilled craftsmen, at best.2 27
The vast scope of copyright protection alone undermines any
connection with the romantic model of authorship. Copyright is not
limited to works of genius. Since Bleistein, courts have held
themselves incompetent to distinguish between the inspired and the
mundane. 228 Nor is copyright limited to the kinds of works likely to
exhibit their creators' personalities. Even a telephone book, if it is
not organized in the most obvious fashion, can satisfy the minimal

222. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1985); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954).
223. See Jaszi, supra note 7, at 475 ("For many purposes, the 'work' displaced the
'author' as the central idea of copyright law, facilitating the redefinition of the boundary
between proprietary control and free public access.").
224. See id. at 478.
225. See id. ("Once the penumbral concept of the 'work' was firmly in place, the
purchasers could acquire a general dominion over the imaginative territory of a particular
literary or artistic production. Publishers could use this 'authority' to exclude from that
territory not only strangers but the very 'author' who first delimited it.").
226. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.").
227. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying note 202.
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requirements of originality and creativity. 29 Computer programs are
also copyrightable subject matter.23 Although arguments have been
made that programming is more akin to traditional forms of
authorship than one would suppose,23 ' the admixture of utilitarian
concerns and technical craftsmanship certainly clouds the picture.
Peter Jaszi complains that the indiscriminate subject matter of
copyright, the emphasis on the work, and the reluctance of courts to
judge artistic merit "effaces and generalizes 'authorship,' leaving this
category with little or no meaningful content and none of its
traditional associations., 21 2 One is certainly entitled to ask what
authorship is, if it is not the communication of unique thoughts
originating somewhere in the author's own personality. If there is no
"magic," no ex nihilo alchemy in the crucible of genius, and if text
creation is little more than a patchwork assembly of existing
fragments, what does the individual contribute to the text that earns
him the title of "the author"? The next section considers some
alternatives based on the precepts of information theory.
C. Alternative Models of Authorship
The potential relationship between "originality" in copyright and
"entropy" in information theory suggests at least two alternatives to
the romantic model of authorship. The first alternative equates
authorship with the addition of noise to a signal. The second
proposes that authorship, like the addition of information to a
message, reflects "freedom of choice" in the selection of one means
of expression from a variety of available means. The second
alternative is less disparaging of the talents of authors than the first,
yet it is still "unromantic" enough to be more inclusive, and less
dependent on the notion of genius or personality, than the
traditional model.

229. See Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that "Chinese Yellow Pages" met requirement of originality). But cf.
BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (1 1th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (holding the more conventional "Yellow Pages" directory unoriginal).
230. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-49
(3d Cir. 1983).
231. See Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper
Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493, 1535-36, 1583
(1987).
232.

Jaszi, supra note 7, at 483.
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1. Authors as "noisy channels"
The romantic model of authorship treats the author, in the
terminology of information theory, as a "message source. 23 3 One
could imagine an alternative and pointedly unromantic model in
which the author is merely a "channel. ," 23 4 Imagine an artist who
paints a sunset as it occurs and as realistically as he possibly can. The
scene is the "message," and the artist, like the canvas, only a medium
through which the message is conveyed to its ultimate recipient: the
viewer of the painting. Like most channels of communication, the
artist is an imperfect medium and introduces "noise." His eyesight is
poor, his technique flawed, his materials unequal to the task. Some
information is lost as the artist generalizes, perhaps substituting a
single shade of orange for the subtle range of hues in the scene
before him. Other information is added--even if it is what Weaver
would call "undesirable information." For example, the geometrical
outlines of a building-regular enough to be compressed by efficient
coding into a short message-might be transformed by the artist's
unsteady hand into a far more complex figure. Whatever contributes
to the painting's entropy-its randomness, disorder, and
unpredictability-adds information, at least as Shannon used the
term.

23 5

Some of the information conveyed by the painting would have
its origin in the scene that the artist had observed. The artist would
not be the "author" of that information, which would fall in the
realm of discovered facts. 236 However, the added information
corresponding
to the imperfections-the
noise added in
transmission-would be, in some senses, "original." Information
theorists speak of "conditional entropy" in the context of message
transmission through a "noisy channel." The entropy of the received
signal (denoted H(y)) is a function of the entropy of the source
(H(x)) and of any additional entropy added in transmission. The
conditional entropy H(y) represents the entropy of the received
signal "when the input is known. 232 Hence, the conditional entropy
reflects information attributable to the noisy channel rather than to
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra note 26 and Figure 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
See supra Part I.A.
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 66.
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the source. Perhaps one could define the "original" or "authored"
aspects of the artist's painting as equivalent to its conditional
entropy.
There is some precedent for equating authorship with noise. In
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,238 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs mezzotint reproductions of
public domain paintings were sufficiently original to be
copyrighted.2 39 In the passage for which the case is remembered, the
court observed that
even if [the mezzotints'] substantial departures from the paintings
were inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A copyist's bad
eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of
thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having
hit upon such a variation2 40unintentionally, the "author" may adopt
it as his and copyright it.
The court provided "inadvertent errors in translation" as an example
of a distinguishable, copyrightable variation.24 '
Professor Litman offers "this image of the individual whose
apparent creativity is the product of imperfect eyesight, flawed
execution, or unrelated circumstances" as "a metaphor for
authorship in general."2 42 It does, at least, suggest what an individual
"author" might contribute to a text that is, in most respects, a
cultural or societal undertaking. Moreover, the authorship-asaccident model serves many of the interests of copyright doctrine.
The randomizing, or disordering, aspect of flawed execution
enhances entropy, providing the text with a more distinctive
"signature." If several artists were painting the same sunset, the more
their hands trembled and their paint dripped the more each painting
would be uniquely identifiable. That would prove useful to an artist
who charged that his work had been infringed by copying, because
an accused infringer would find it difficult to explain why the
plaintiff's mistakes also appeared in her own work.2 43 More

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
streets in

191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105 (citations omitted).
Id. at 105 n.25.
Litman, supra note 6, at 1010.
Authors sometimes deliberately include "mistakes" in their works, such as false
an atlas or invented telephone listings in a directory, in order to more easily detect
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importantly, treating the noise alone as "original" would preserve
the dichotomies that are so fundamental to copyright doctrine.24 4
Noise is comfortably within the realm of expression, at least as
contrasted to facts or ideas. Exclusive rights to noise take nothing
from the public domain nor do they limit the opportunities of
subsequent authors.
The "noisy channel" model stands in sharp contrast to the
romantic model of the author/genius. The least-skilled author
would qualify as the most "original" and could most easily enforce
his rights. If the noise were actually random---as it would need to be
to maximize entropy-nothing distinctive of the author or his
personality could be identified in the "authored" aspects of the
work. While random information tends to be unique, the overall
effect is one of sameness.2 45 Nor could authorship any longer be
equated with the transmission of meaning from author to audience.
If the audience discovered any meaning in an accidental variation, it
would have to be accidental meaning, as if typing monkeys chanced
246
to produce a coherent text.
The "noisy channel" author is such an insignificant figure 247 that
one might wonder whether he has earned any legal rights. He may
copying. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991); Nester's
Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Corp., 796 F. Supp. 729, 732-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Street addresses in a directory were changed, in part to detect copying; nevertheless, the court
employed a theory of "copyright estoppel" to hold those facts uncopyrightable as though they
had been genuine. Id.
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 251 ("Mathematically, white Gaussian noise, which
contains all frequencies equally, is the epitome of the various and unexpected. It is the least
predictable, the most original of sounds. To a human being, however, all white Gaussian noise
sounds alike. Its subtleties are hidden from him, and he says that it is dull and monotonous.").
A random visual image would resemble the snow on a television set in the absence of a
broadcast signal--"gray, perpetually agitated, foggy undulation with little, capricious,
constantly changing outlines." MOLES, supra note 1, at 61. Because the image "contains too
much information ... it exceeds our capacity for understanding and creates boredom." Id.
246. Eighteenth-century satirist Jonathan Swift described a machine for producing
random strings of words, from which, it was hoped, "a complete body of all arts and sciences"
might be pieced together. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS, in GULLIVER'S TRAVELS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 23, 180-81 (Miriam Kosh Starkman ed., Bantam Books 1981)
(1726).
247. Professor Jaszi, discussing the "distinguishable variation" test of Alfred Bell, argues
that "[t]he nature of any creative investment in the variations is, as a practical matter, simply
irrelevant to the outcome, save in one respect: the variations must be traceable to a human
actor; they cannot arise from mere mechanical mishaps." Jaszi, supranote 7, at 484. Even that
might overstate the case. It would be hard to separate the "distinguishable variation" created

69]
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have invested some labor in his clumsy efforts, but compensation for
labor or "sweat of the brow" has been rejected as a theoretical basis
for copyright, at least in the context of rewarding the labor expended
in discovering uncopyrightable facts.248 On the other hand, the
careless author might discover a variation that is not only
distinguishable but also pleasing. Noise ceases to be a background
distraction and becomes a foreground point of interest if the
audience is willing to regard it in that fashion.249 More of these noisy
variations will be discovered, to the ultimate benefit of the
consuming public, if authors have a financial incentive to keep
working. 2 "° At any rate, we could use such arguments to justify
authorial rights in works that are genuinely random or
indeterminate.251
The "noisy channel" model might satisfy some literary theorists;
it minimizes the human presence of the author and, by default,
emphasizes the characteristics of the work and the audience's
reaction to it. 25 2 Yet it offers an incomplete picture of what authors

by the slip of the painter's brush from a similar variation created by a paper jam in a
photocopier, except that it might be easier to identify the person who had held the brush than
the person responsible for jamming the machine. On the other hand, some participation by a
human actor in the creation of the work aids in distinguishing between copyrightable writings
and uncopyrightable discoveries, even if the distinction is somewhat arbitrary. See Alan L.
Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM.& MARY L. REv. 569,
636-38 (2002).
248. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 352-53 (reasoning that the "sweat of the brow" theory is
based on the mistaken notion "that copyright [is] a reward for the hard work that went into
compiling [the] facts").
249. Such is the rationale behind composer John Cage's notorious 4'33", a work in
which a pianist or other performer sits in silence while the audience experiences the ambient
noises of the auditorium. See PAUL GRIFFITHS, OXFORD STUDIES OF COMPOSERS (18): CAGE
28 (1981) ("433"was thus not just a comic stunt but a demonstration that the sounds of the
environment have a value no less than that of composed music, for in truth there is no
silence . . . ."); MOLES, supra note 1, at 100 ("Noise can be logically defined only on the basis

of intent. A noise is a message that someone does not want to transmit or to receive .... When
the receptor is an individual and the transmitter the external world, the concept of intent gives
way to that of choice, that is, of value judgment. "); MICHAEL NYMAN, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC:

CAGE AND BEYOND 53 (1981) ("Cage had found that 'silence' is full of (unintentional)
sounds which may be of use to the composer and listener ....").
250. Many of these variations would be worthless, but the public can simply decline to
purchase them.
251. See Durham, supra note 247, at 632-33.
252. See Jaszi, supra note 7, at 484 (explaining that the "distinguishable variation" test
derived from Alfred Bell "is one that focuses attention on the work, rather than on its
'author"').
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do, even if authorship is regarded primarily as a process of
rearranging or transforming materials found in prior works or in
nature. As Professor Litman observes, not all of the transformation is
accidental: "[s]ome of [it] is purposeful,"25 and "much of it is the
product of an author's peculiar astigmatic vision."2" 4 Even the latter
is "peculiar" to the individual author-it is not random noise but
noise distinctive of its source, as recent efforts to identify anonymous
authors by their stylistic quirks have demonstrated."' More
importantly, most authors are not, like the hypothetical painter,
attempting to transmit a flawless reproduction of external
phenomena. Some forms of authorship, such as fiction or music,
communicate information about the world only in the most general
sense. Even the relatively objective art of photography mixes accurate
depiction with personal expression." 6 To the extent that an author is
a "channel," much of what is "channeled" seems to come from
within. Hence, a more promising, more inclusive alternative to the
romantic model of authorship is a model inspired by the association
of information and freedom of selection.25 7
2. Authorship as unconstrainedselection
As previously discussed,258 some information theorists treat
Shannon's H as a measure of the message sender's freedom to select
from among an array of alternative messages. The information
content of a message is inversely proportional to the constraints
placed on the message source, either by the redundancy built into
the code (e.g., if the first letter is q, the next must be u) or by
characteristics of the situation that produce a more predictable
message (e.g., peach pie as usual). Such constraints are partially
responsible for the selection of a particular message. The message
recipient might not be aware of those constraints. The recipient
might think, initially, that all letters are equally likely to follow q or
that a customer is as likely to order one flavor of pie as another.

253. Litman, supra note 6, at 1010.
254. Id.
255. See DON FOSTER, AUTHOR UNKNOWN (2000).
256. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (concluding
that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was "the product of plaintifPs intellectual invention").
257. See supratext accompanying notes 69-73.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
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Eventually, the patterns emerging in a series of messages would
reveal such constraints to the recipient, rendering the content of the
messages more predictable and reducing the recipient's perception of
the information content of those messages.
One could devise a similar selection-oriented definition of
authorship. An author is in some respects a source, a channel, and an
encoder.25 9 In each role, an author exercises choice. An author
chooses the ideas to be included in the work and chooses how they
will be expressed.26 ° "Authorship" might be defined as the process of
selection applied to the attributes of a writing.26 1 A text freely
selected from among an array of alternatives could be considered an
"original work of authorship," in contrast to an "inevitable" and
therefore unoriginal text, like the Feist telephone directory.262
Writers, illustrators, composers, and "authors" of every other
stripe constantly engage in the process of selection. In Burrow-Giles,
for example, the Court held a photograph of Oscar Wilde to be an
"authored" work because of the choices the photographer had made
in pose, lighting, costume, props, and so forth.26 3 Even when the
means of expression are not under the author's complete
control-e.g., the paint drips or a finger slips on the keyboard-the
author ultimately chooses to "adopt" the unintended variation or to
discard it and try again. At the same time, an author's selections are
constrained, or certain selections made more probable, by a variety
of circumstances. Most authors employ existing languages or styles,
which by their conventions add a certain amount of "redundancy" to
the expression. 2" Once the choice of subject has been made, authors

259. See supraFigure 1.
260. The amendments, excisions, and substitutions often found in handwritten
manuscripts show that process of selection at work. See, e.g., THE PIERPONT MORGAN
LIBRARY, A CHRISTMAS CAROL BY CHARLES DICKENS: A FACSIMILE OF THE MANUSCRIPT IN

THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY (James H. Heineman, Inc. 1967) (1843).
261. This refers to "writing" in the broad sense in which "writing" is used in the
copyright statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
262. We will assume, for purposes of discussion, that the alphabetical arrangement of
telephone subscribers is as routine and inevitable as the court suggests. Professor Nimmer
disputes that. See Nimmer, supra note 11, at 97-98 (arguing that the alphabetizer makes so
many choices that each directory is necessarily "a profoundly unique compilation").
263. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
264. An information theorist would regard an author's own style as a form of constraint
that diminishes the information content of his message. If a listener were intimately familiar
with the style of a particular composer, the listener might guess in advance how a new piece
would sound or, once it had begun, how it might progress. Such stylistic attributes might

117

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2004

who depict external phenomena are further limited by what they
observe. However, few authors are so constrained by such factors
that we could predict in advance the choices they would make.
Those choices may be the product of influences so varied and so
personal to a particular author that they almost defy explanation:
What does influence the choice among words when the words used
in constructing grammatical sentences are chosen, not at random
by a machine, but rather by a living human being who, through
long training, speaks or writes English according to the rules of
grammar? This question is not to be answered by a vague appeal to
the word meaning. Our criteria in producing English sentences can
be very complicated indeed.265
An author's choices might be attributed to inspiration or
incompetence. Some choices might be genuinely haphazard. The
important thing, so far as this model of authorship is concerned, is
that selection has occurred.
The concept of authorship as selection, and originality as
freedom from constraint, would not be entirely new to copyright
law. Factual compilations are currently recognized as copyrightable,
even though the facts themselves are not, if the facts are "selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship. 2 66 The selection is
original as long as it is chosen from an array of alternatives, and it is
not, like the selection of telephone numbers in Feist, a foregone
conclusion. The approach I suggest would extend the compilations
model to other forms of authorship.
Emphasis on selection is not inconsistent with the romantic ideal
of authorship. The romantic qualities of personality, individualism,
and genius could be expressed through selection. Only Leonardo,
one could say, would have chosen such an expression for his Mona
Lisa. However, one can imagine a selection-based model of
authorship as neutral--even "unromantic"-like the models of

diminish information, but they should not be discounted as an aspect of authorship. Selections
driven by the author's personal inclinations are a clear example of authorial expression, in
contrast to selections driven by existing conventions that the author merely adopts. Of course,
one must still bear in mind the prohibition on copyrighting ideas or systems of expression,
which, original or not, are so general that public policy demands their general availability.
265. PIERCE, supranote 19, at 116.

266. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added).
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information theories concerning the transmission of data. The
information content of a message does not depend on the genius, or
lack thereof, of the message source. Shannon's H is solely a measure
of the array of possible messages and their statistical probability.
Because information is a function of disorder, the unskilled
improvisations of a keyboard novice might contain more information
than a classical fugue. Even a random message generated by a
mechanical source would be rich in information; here we would not
speak of information in terms of the source's freedom of choice, but
rather in terms of the recipient's uncertainty based on inability to
predict the characteristics of the message.26 7 We could similarly
define "original works of authorship" purely in terms of selection
from an array of alternatives, ignoring the romantic or unromantic
origins of the selection.
In important respects, an unromantic, selection-based model of
authorship would parallel contemporary literary theory. It would
focus attention on the work rather than the author. Originality
would be a characteristic of the text--or, more precisely, of the text
in the context of the available alternatives-just as information is a
characteristic of a message, not of the message sender. A work
created by accident or by a clumsy novice might be as original, or
more original, than one created by the deliberate actions of a
"genius." Because selection operates on preexisting materials,
authorship also would not require the romantic model's notion of
creation ex nihilo. Finally, the selection-based model could dispense
with the romantic idea of authorship as the communication of
meaning--specifically, the meaning intended by the author.2 68
Meaning imposes order, restricts choice, and decreases entropy.
Weaver's "vague feeling" that information and meaning might be
"subject to some joint restriction that condemns a person to the
sacrifice of the one as he insists on having much of the other"2'69
might be more persuasively applied to authorship and meaning. The
more meaning an author wishes to convey, the fewer choices he may
have. The meaningless affords greater room for originality (in this
limited sense) than the meaningful.

267. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
268. See supra text accompanying note 216.
269. SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 22, at 28.
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As discussed in Part II.B, the subject of limited choices usually
arises in copyright law in the context of merger. If facts or ideas can
be expressed in so few ways that copyright on the expression
threatens to monopolize the facts or ideas, the doctrine of merger
denies copyright even to the expression.2"' In Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel,
Inc., z1 the plaintiff pointed out that because its command codes
were "arbitrary," they "could have been written in a variety of
different ways, not only the way that was chosen by [its]
engineers., 27 2 The court brushed this aside in the course of finding
the command codes "unoriginal" and faulted Mitel for "fail[ing] to
recognize that originality is an independent requirement that
is not
273
satisfied merely because the merger doctrine is inapplicable.
The concepts of originality and merger are unrelated if
originality is dependent on the romantic notion of authorship as an
expression of the author's personality or if a work of authorship must
be the product of an author's intellectual labor. 274 A form of
expression chosen at random from a large number of available forms
of expression would present no issue of merger, even though the
work required no effort to produce and bore no evidence of the
author's personality. On the other hand, if the only purpose of the
originality requirement is to distinguish private property from the
public domain in the manner that most benefits the public, it would
not be surprising to find a close relationship between originality and
merger. The principle of merger ensures that private rights do not
frustrate the progress of knowledge by denying authors access to
facts and ideas. It is a corollary, in part, to the fact/expression
dichotomy, by which Feist defines the concept of authorship.2 75
Hence, the absence of merger might go far toward demonstrating
the presence of authorship/originality.27 6
One could go overboard in equating originality with absence of
constraint, along the lines suggested by the relationship between
information and entropy. Inevitably, some forms of expression are
270. See supra text accompanying notes 157-69.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
272. Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373 n.6 (10th Cir. 1997).
273. Id.
274. See Durham, supra note 247, at 607-23.
275. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991).
276. Note that an original idea alone cannot avoid merger, because other authors must
be permitted to express that same idea.
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preferable to others and are chosen for that reason. If one form of
expression is preferred, even based on purely aesthetic
considerations, an information theorist might consider that sufficient
to bias the probabilities toward that form of expression, thereby
reducing the information content of the message. One could even
regard each form of expression as unique in its ability to affect the
"conditional probability matrix" of the recipient,2 77 if that includes
the way the message affects the recipient's emotions or sensibilities.
At the same time, one could dispute the freedom of a human author
to choose any expression other than the one the author did choose.
In the context of information theory, David L. Ritchie observes that
every aspect of a message has an antecedent cause and that the more
one knows about those causes, the less information the message
bears.27 One could argue, similarly, that authors really have little
choice in what they select; if one knew enough about the author,
one could see that every choice was predetermined, unless the author
employed some random process such as flipping a coin.279
Such reasoning could lead to the absurd conclusion that only
random selections are original and only those who employ a pair of
dice or its equivalent are truly authors. But unless the work is of the
kind where very few choices are possible, no observer could predict
in advance-or even after experiencing a portion of the work--how
the expression will be realized. That would be sufficient for the work
to convey "information" to its audience,2"' and it should be
sufficient as well to demonstrate the presence of originality, assuming

277. See supra text accompanying note 99.
278. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 61 ("Perhaps if we knew enough about a man, his
environment, and his history, we could always predict just what word he would write or speak
next."); RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 46 ("If everything that can possibly be known about the
context, including the speaker's and the listener's full psychological and social history, could be
included in the calculation of conditional probabilities, the structural redundancy of typical
messages in a natural language would probably increase well beyond the 70% that has been
estimated on the basis of grammatical structure alone. If every behavior is fully caused by
antecedent events, as scientists commonly assume, then a full account of external structure
would increase structural redundancy to 100% and reduce H to zero.").
279. Composer John Cage often flipped coins to determine the attributes of his music.
See generally CHRISTOPHER SHULTIS, SILENCING THE SOUNDED SELF 93 (1998).
280. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 61-62 ("[W]e can derive certain statistical data which,
as we have seen, help to narrow the probability as to what the next word or letter of a message
will be. There remains an element of uncertainty. For us who have incomplete knowledge of it,
the message source behaves as if certain choices were made at random, insofar as we cannot
predict what the choices will be.").
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that the unpredictability is a property of the expression rather than of
the facts or ideas expressed.
Probably no works that have been held copyrightable, applying
romantic notions of authorship, need be held uncopyrightable
applying this less romantic model. On the other hand, some works
that have been held lacking in authorship under the romantic
model-works created by arbitrary, indeterminate, or mechanical
means--might qualify as original works of authorship under an
unromantic, selection-oriented model. The command codes in Mitel,
for example, might not have been created by any process that
qualifies as romantic authorship,"' but if the standard of originality is
based on the availability of alternatives, the codes would plainly
qualify for copyright protection. In fact, copyright protection would
be easier to justify than if the codes, as the court seemed to desire,
"meant something."2 8
A selection-based model of authorship would have to operate in
conjunction with the traditional dichotomies of copyright law.
Freedom to select from a variety of facts to report (e.g., the
population of one town among thousands) should not give the
reporter a copyright monopoly on the selected fact. 83 The
idea/expression dichotomy also must play its traditional, policyoriented role. The choices of expression available to an author
depend upon the level of abstraction at which the idea of the work is
defined.28 4 One could still begin with the question of originality by
considering the range of possible texts of which the work at issue is
one example, but one would have to ensure that the freedom of
selection existed at the specific level of expression as well as at the
general level of idea. No less is required today in order to determine

281. See supra text accompanying note 206.
282. Copyrighting any industry-standard codes or part numbers would impact
competition in markets distinct from that for the copyrightable expression--a problem that
might warrant some form of "fair use" exception. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 352 (1989) ("We hope the
debate [over the copyrightability of industry standard computer interface screens] will be
resolved not by the semantics of the words 'idea' and 'expression' but by the economics of the
problem and, specifically, by comparing the deadweight costs of allowing a firm to appropriate
what has become an industry standard with the disincentive effects on originators if such
appropriation is forbidden.").
283. Selection of a subset of facts from a larger universe may constitute a form of
expression. See supra text accompanying note 150.
284. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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whether the selection of material renders a compilation an original
work of authorship.
An unromantic, text-oriented model of authorship would require
some reinterpretation of the landmark Feist decision. Feist, to a
degree, perpetuated the romantic model of authorship by requiring
"a modicum of intellectual labor" in copyrightable works2 8 -a
condition that directly concerns the process of creation rather than
the attributes of the text-and by demanding "creativity,1 286 a
concept evocative of the "magical" qualities of the author/genius.
On the other hand, Feist dismissed labor (or "sweat of the brow") as
a justification for copyrighting facts,287 so one can infer that the
"intellectual labor" invested in expression is required, not for its own
sake, but to ensure that the expression is unique rather than
"inevitable." Feist also held that the alphabetical organization of the
plaintiff's telephone directory lacked "the minimal creative spark
required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution" because that
organization was "an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and
288
so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course.',
If the organization is "expected as a matter of course," it does not
embody the unexpectedness that would be the hallmark of
originality under the alternative model of authorship. One could,
therefore, adjust the reasoning of Feist just enough to make creative
labor one means of achieving an unpredictable/original result rather
than the only acceptable means. This would be consistent with the
fundamental goal of Feist, which is not to reward the labor of
authors or to defend their personality interests but, rather, to
promote the public interest by balancing legal rights in expression
against the exhaustible resources of the public domain.28 9

285. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) ("'[A]
modicum of intellectual labor ... clearly constitutes an essential constitutional element."'
(quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.08[C][1]) (1990)) (alterations in original); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884) (referring to "intellectual production ... thought, and
conception" as attributes of authorship); The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)
(requiring "work of the brain").
286. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46.
287. Id. at 352-53.
288. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
289. See Durham, supranote 247, at 621-23.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Authorship is seldom an exercise in unlimited freedom. For a
variety of reasons, including the practicalities of communicating with
an audience, authors subject themselves to certain constraints. An
English-speaking poet commemorating the Battle of Hastings will
find his expression directed, to a degree, by the conventions of
English vocabulary, syntax, punctuation, and spelling; by his chosen
meter and rhyme scheme; and by the fact that the Normans won. An
information theorist would find much in the poem that was, in the
specialized sense, "redundant." Yet another poet, subject to the same
constraints of language, form, and history, would likely produce an
easily distinguishable text. Unless an author is working in a very
restrictive form, like an alphabetical list, there is much expression to
choose from, and each author will choose differently. In such
selection resides the "information" conveyed by the poem.
The romantic model of authorship attributes such selection to
the operation of the author's individual genius or, at the very least,
individual personality. Judicial decisions that require evidence of
some "work of the brain" or a personal "stamp" in order to find that
a work of authorship is "original" reflect that romantic model. As we
have seen, literary theorists question the validity of the romantic
model, preferring to focus on the possibilities inherent in the text
rather than on the inspiration of the text's creator. Copyright law,
intended to reflect the interests of the public rather than the natural
rights of the author/genius, may also be best served by a lessromantic, more text-oriented model of originality. A promising
source for such a model is Shannon's conception of "information,"
which is meaning-neutral and, so to speak, genius-neutral. It
distinguishes between the "redundant" aspects of a message, which
are expected or predetermined, and the unpredictable, spontaneous
aspects that convey information. Shannon's approach is close in spirit
and in fact to the distinction that copyright doctrine draws through
the concepts of authorship, originality, and creativity.
If copyright were to sever its remaining ties to the romantic
model in favor of the more neutral, selection-oriented criteria
previously discussed, a wider array of texts would be copyrightable,
including those that are rich in "information" precisely because they
were not produced by the ordered thought processes and restrictive
predilections of an author/genius. As a random message embodies
the highest level of "information," one could argue that it also

Copyright and Information Theory
embodies the highest level of "originality." That is not a ridiculous
conclusion, if the point of "originality" is to ensure that exclusive
rights to the copyrighted work still leave "enough and as good"29
for the use of society and subsequent authors. The least-ordered
texts are also the most abundant and probably the least essential as
material for the public domain. This might cheapen authorship in
some fashion, including works within the realm of copyright that
many would consider unworthy of the honor. However, once those
rights are secured, the marketplace can determine what is and is not
valuable.
I take seriously those information theorists who caution against
using Shannon's theories indiscriminately in fields where they do not
belong.29 ' It is certainly the case that copyright policy should be
determined by the practical objectives of promoting knowledge and
stimulating public discourse, rather than by forced analogy to a
mathematical insight, however fundamental that insight may be. On
the other hand, information theory suggests an intriguing substitute
for the much-criticized romantic model of authorship, a substitute
not too far removed from the accepted principles of copyright
doctrine; originality, like information, is not a product of genius, but
of freedom. Those who question the traditional model of authorship,
confined as it is by its romantic subtext, may find this a fruitful
alternative.

290. Writing in the context of natural rights, John Locke qualified his position that
property rights could be based on the mixture of labor and material taken from the commons
with the "proviso" that "enough and as good [be] left in [the] common[s] for others" to
exploit. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1952) (1690). That proviso plays an important role in modern
thinking regarding rights in intellectual property. See, e.g., Wendy J.Gordon, A PropertyRight
in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the NaturalLaw of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533, 1565, 1560-72 ("Locke here takes a step that helps to justify an exclusion
right, for, with the proviso satisfied, the public's fundamental entitlements will not be impaired
if the owner excludes it from the owned resource.").
291. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 229 ("I [have read] a good deal more about
information theory and psychology than I can or care to remember. Much of it was a mere
association of new terms with old and vague ideas. Presumably the hope was that a stirring in
of new terms would clarify the old ideas by a sort of sympathetic magic.") (alteration in
original).
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